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ABSTRACT 
  This Article explores the failure of nominations and the delay in 
confirmation of successful nominations across recent administrations, 
with a focus on the November 2013 change to the Senate voting rules. 
Using a new database of all nonroutine civilian nominations from 
January 1981 to December 2014, there are several key findings. First, 
approximately one-quarter of submitted nominations between 1981 
and 2014 were not confirmed, with a higher failure rate for the last 
two Presidents. Nominations to courts of appeals and independent 
regulatory commissions had much higher failure rates than other 
entities. Second, for confirmed nominations, the time to confirmation 
has been increasing. President Obama’s nominees faced confirmation 
delays that were more than twice as long as President Reagan’s 
choices. Failure rates of nominations did not always go hand-in-hand 
with confirmation delays for successful nominations. Although more 
nominations failed in divided government, confirmation delays were 
roughly equal when different parties controlled the Senate and the 
White House. Third, comparing the year after the change to the 
filibuster rules to the preceding year, confirmation times for the courts 
decreased but increased for all types of agencies. For many agencies 
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and agency positions, however, significantly fewer nominations failed 
after the voting change. Even so, these improvements in 2014—to the 
confirmation rates for both agency and judicial nominees and to the 
confirmation pace for judicial picks—are relative: for the average 
nomination, the failure rate was higher and the confirmation process 
was slower than under preceding administrations. Fourth, nearly 30 
percent of nominees hailed from the District of Columbia, Maryland, 
and Virginia, raising concerns that the confirmation process may be 
narrowing the pool of top officials. This Article suggests some 
possible explanations for the findings and further avenues of 
investigation, and also proposes some reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All of the plum positions in the federal courts and agencies are 
never fully staffed. The process to fill these attractive and important 
jobs involves two branches of government. Under the Constitution, 
all judges on Article III courts and the top leaders of federal agencies 
have to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.1 
If Congress has not chosen otherwise, “inferior” officers—who still 
exercise significant authority but are typically directed and supervised 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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by someone other than the President2—have to go through the same 
process.3 We call these “PAS”4 positions. There are currently over 
2000 of them: 874 Article III, territorial court, and Court of 
International Trade judgeships,5 and 1217 agency positions.6 
The vacancies in these leadership positions can be staggering. In 
one of my studies, top jobs in executive agencies and cabinet 
departments had been vacant (or filled by an acting official) between 
15 and 25 percent of the time, on average, in recent administrations.7 
And the problem may be worse for the current administration.8 There 
are cycles of agency vacancies: at the start of an administration when 
Presidents transition from campaigning to governing, in the middle 
when the first (or second) set of officials departs to another 
administration position or to a non-governmental perch (including at 
the start of a second term), and in the final year or two when officials 
leave the administration, often to take advantage of their 
governmental connections.9 Until very recently, the Chief Justice 
regularly called attention to judicial vacancies—often termed 
 
 2. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 4. PAS positions are those positions that require presidential appointment with Senate 
confirmation. 
 5. U.S. COURTS, Judges and Judgeships: Federal Judgeships, http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 6. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., POLICY AND 
SUPPORTING POSITIONS app. 1, at 200 (Comm. Print 2012) (quadrennial report commonly 
referred to as the “Plum Book”).  
 7. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 913, 965 (2009). 
 8. See PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO 
BETTER 315 (2014) (reporting that “over 40 percent of . . . senior leadership positions [in the 
Department of Homeland Security] were either vacant or had an ‘acting’ placeholder when the 
president finally nominated a new secretary in October 2013”); Michael D. Shear, Trading 
Blame as U.S. Posts Stay Unfilled, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2013, at A1, A14 (noting that nearly 25 
percent of senior State Department and about 30 percent of senior Commerce Department jobs 
were not filled with Senate-confirmed appointees); Eileen Sullivan & Alicia A. Caldwell, 
Napolitano Departure Bares Gaps in DHS Leadership, U-T SAN DIEGO (July 13, 2013, 7:11 
AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/jul/13/napolitano-departure-bares-gaps-in-dhs-
leadership (noting that one-third of top Department of Homeland Security jobs were vacant or 
filled with acting officials); Gordon Lubold, Help Wanted at the Pentagon, FP’S SITUATION REP. 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/25/help-wanted-at-the-pentagon-wilkerson-
being-investigated-for-an-extramarital-affair-mikulski-wants-some-r-e-s-p-e-c-t-hagel-pressed-
on-syrian-cw-hand-sanitizer-as-sexual-assault-prevention-tool-a (finding that more than 20 
percent of top Department of Defense positions were vacant or filled with acting officials).  
 9. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 917–20. 
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“judicial emergencies” by the Judicial Conference, depending on the 
relevant court’s workload—in his annual reports to Congress.10 
In the face of these vacancies, complaints targeting the 
confirmation component of the appointments process are 
commonplace. For instance, in a September 30, 2010 letter to Senate 
officials, President Obama criticized the Senate’s slow pace on 
judicial nominations: “Proceeding this way will put our judiciary on a 
dangerous course, as the Department of Justice projects that fully half 
of the Federal judiciary will be vacant by 2020 if we continue on the 
current pace of judicial confirmations.”11 President Obama is not 
alone. Every recent modern President has complained that the Senate 
is not acting quickly enough on nominations.12 It is not just Presidents 
who protest. Commentators with no connection to the White House 
also lament the length of the confirmation process.13 
In response to these delays, some called for the end of 
filibustering nominees—specifically, for the elimination of the three-
fifths hurdle to close debate and hold a vote.14 These supermajority 
mandates empower the minority when the same party controls the 
Senate and the White House, whether that minority is Republican or 
Democrat. When George W. Bush was President, Republican 
 
 10. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2003); JOHN ROBERTS, JR., YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011); Tony 
Mauro, Chief Justice Roberts Readies Tenth Annual Year-End Report, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 29, 
2014. Scholars have noted that in some recent years “more than 10 percent of the seats on the 
federal bench have been vacant.” Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics of Advice 
and Consent: Putting Federal Judges on the Federal Bench, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 241, 
242 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009). 
 11. Michael D. Shear, Obama Blasts G.O.P. for Stalling Judicial Nomination, N.Y. TIMES: 
THE CAUCUS (Oct. 1, 2010, 6:48 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/obama-
blasts-gop-for-stalling-judicial-nominations (reprinting President Obama’s letter). 
 12. See Associated Press, Clinton Worries About Attacks on Nominees, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 
21, 1994, at A3; 150 Bush Nominees Still Await Confirmation, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Dec. 29, 1991, at 10A; Ian R. Allen, White House Asks End to Appointee Backlog, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 9, 1985, at A17; Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: 
Senate Must Act on Nominations to Federal Courts and Agencies (Feb. 7, 2008), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080207-9.html.  
 13. See, e.g., JAMES P. PFIFFNER, DWIGHT INK, DAVID LEWIS & ANNE O’CONNELL, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., STRENGTHENING ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP: FIXING THE 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2012); Paul C. Light, Op-Ed, Nominate and Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 2009, at A27; Norman Ornstein, Confirmation Process Leaves Government in Serious 
Gridlock, ROLL CALL (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_108/ornstein/33458-
1.html. 
 14. See, e.g., Editorial, Filibustering Nominees Must End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at A10; 
Norman Ornstein, A Filibuster Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at A19.  
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Senators contemplated eliminating the filibuster rule.15 More recently, 
Democratic Senators had reached the brink of major changes to the 
filibuster rules and stepped back once agreement (with the 
Republicans) was reached to confirm certain nominees.16 Filibusters, 
in the form of preventing a vote on the nomination, however, 
continued. In February 2013, Senate Republicans blocked a vote on 
one of their own—Chuck Hagel, a former Republican Senator—to 
become Secretary of Defense, “the first-ever filibuster against a 
Pentagon chief.”17 Republicans (and Democrats in earlier times) have 
used other delay tactics as well, including giving a nominee hundreds 
of written questions that the nominee had to answer in writing before 
a confirmation vote.18 In late October 2013, Senate Republicans 
refused to advance under the supermajority cloture rules the 
nomination of Representative Melvin Watt to head the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency and Patricia Ann Millett to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, creating outrage among Democrats.19 
The New York Times repeated its call for the demise of the 
filibuster.20 
A few weeks later, on November 21, all but three of the Senate 
Democrats voted to change the Senate’s rules, so that all 
confirmations (other than those to the Supreme Court) could proceed 
by majority vote.21 The change resulted from allowing a simple 
majority (instead of three-fifths) to set time limits on the 
 
 15. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 255. 
 16. Jonathan Weisman, Filibuster Deal Heralds Stirring of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2013, at A13; Jonathan Weisman, Senate Strikes Filibuster Deal, Ending Logjam on 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A1; see generally Ezra Klein, Let’s Talk: The Move to 
Reform the Filibuster, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2013, at 24. These reform-minded Senators 
did make minor progress. Jeremy W. Peters, New Senate Rules to Curtail the Excesses of a 
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A18; see generally Richard S. Beth & Anthony J. 
Madonna, The Senate’s “Nuclear” Precedent: Implications for Efforts to Control the Filibuster 
(American Political Science Association 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Aug. 22, 2014) 
(examining attempts at reform and successful changes to Senate procedure from 1953 to 
present). 
 17. Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Blocks Vote in Senate on Hagel for Defense Post, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2013, at A1. Hagel was subsequently confirmed. Jeremy W. Peters, Hagel 
Approved for Defense in Sharply Split Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A1. 
 18. Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Delays on Nominees Raise Tension, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 
2013, at A1. 
 19. See Jeremy W. Peters, Republicans’ Blocking of Obama Nominees Could Renew 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, at A20. 
 20. Editorial Board, The Politics of Petulance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at A30. 
 21. Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. 
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consideration of almost all nominations.22 Technically, the change was 
not a formal amendment of the Senate’s rules but rather supplanted a 
decision of the chair, who had previously concluded that the rules 
required three-fifths of the Senate to set the time limits.23 This 
controversial maneuver allowed the majority of the Senate to make 
the change.24 The reinterpretation of the Senate’s rules—the so-called 
“nuclear option”—was a major event.25  
As predicted,26 with the Democrats in control of the Senate, 
judicial confirmations appeared to pick up in subsequent months, at 
least with respect to the number of judges placed on the bench.27 
Specifically, three judges who had previously failed to get the then-
necessary sixty votes to end debate were confirmed to the D.C. 
Circuit, tipping the party balance of active judges in favor of 
Democratic nominees.28 But some agency nominations lingered under 
Democratic control. When several cases of Ebola popped up in the 
United States in October 2014, there was no confirmed Surgeon 
General, despite President Obama’s nomination of Dr. Vivek Murthy 
seven months earlier.29 For over four years, there has been an acting 
Assistant Administrator for Water at the Environmental Protection 
Agency, despite a string of nominations submitted to each Congress 
dating back to June 2011.30 Other top environmental and energy 
 
 22. Beth & Madonna, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Peters, supra note 21. See generally Ian Ostrander, Winning the Waiting Game: 
Senatorial Delay in Executive Nominations 196 (Aug. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Washington University in St. Louis) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Any filibuster 
reform will have immediate and profound implications for the executive nomination process.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, 
BROOKINGS FIXGOV (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/
2013/12/30-staffing-federal-judiciary-2013-no-breakthrough-year.  
 27. See Al Kamen, Obama Judges Confirm Numbers Way Up in “Post-Nuclear” World, 
WASH. POST: THE LOOP (June 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-
loop/wp/2014/06/28/obama-judges-confirm-numbers-way-up-in-post-nuclear-world. 
 28. Daniel Wilson, Senate Advances 3rd Contentious DC Circ. Nominee, LAW360 (Jan. 9, 
2014, 8:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/500129/senate-advances-3rd-contentious-dc-circ-
nominee. The three new D.C. Circuit judges are Patricia A. Millett, Cornelia T.L. Pillard, and 
Robert L. Wilkins. Id.  
 29. Kristina Peterson & Louise Radnofsky, Ebola Furor Renews Sparring Over Surgeon 
General Nomination, WALL. ST. J. BLOGS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/
10/17/ebola-furor-renews-sparring-over-surgeon-general-nomination. 
 30. See Robin Bravender, Top Jobs Vacant as Nominees Linger in Confirmation Limbo, 
GREENWIRE (July 1, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060002220; ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, Nancy Stoner, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water, 
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positions as well as ambassadorships have garnered attention.31 It 
took a rare Saturday session in December—which occurred because 
of Republican Senators Ted Cruz’s and Mike Lee’s complaints to a 
spending bill—to confirm the President’s nominee for Surgeon 
General, ten other agency officials, and twelve judges.32 
The Senate shifted to Republican control in January 2015. There 
is some chance the Republicans could restore the filibuster.33 At the 
least, the new Republican majority will presumably slow down 
confirmations in the final two years of President Obama’s 
administration.34 For instance, although cabinet secretaries are 
generally confirmed quite quickly, it took over five months to confirm 
Loretta Lynch as Attorney General.35 Days after she had been placed 
on the Senate calendar, new Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell 
announced that he would not schedule the confirmation vote until 
 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/nancy-stoner-acting-assistant-administrator-water (last updated 
May 8, 2014). 
 31. See Bravender, supra note 30; Editorial Board, Confirmation Dysfunction: Senate 
Should Act on Embarrassing Backlog of Confirmation Nominees, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2014, at 
A18 (“According to the American Foreign Service Association, 47 nominees are awaiting 
confirmation to represent the United States . . . .”). 
 32. Ed O’Keefe & Brady Dennis, Surgeon General Nominee Vivek Murthy, Opposed by 
Gun Lobby, Confirmed, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/12/15/surgeon-general-nominee-vivek-murthy-opposed-by-gun-
lobby-confirmed. 
 33. See Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Are All Over The Place On Senate Filibuster 
Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/21/
republicans-senate-filibuster-reform_n_6194198.html.  
 34. See Gavin Broady, Obama Judicial Noms Face Uphill Battle in Republican Senate, 
LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/609043/obama-judicial-noms-
face-uphill-battle-in-republican-senate; Greg Jaffe & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, White House Seeks 
a Stronger Hand at Pentagon to Manage Crises, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/white-house-seeks-a-stronger-hand-at-pentagon-to-manage-crises/
2014/11/24/438307fa-7414-11e4-9c9f-a37e29e80cd5_story.html. Presidential selections 
presumably will shift as well, with President Obama more likely to pick nominees more 
palatable to Senate Republicans, such as former Senate staffers. See, e.g., Ben James, Obama’s 
NLRB Nominee Swap Seen as Shrewd Strategic Play, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2014, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/595968/obama-s-nlrb-nominee-swap-seen-as-shrewd-strategic-
play; Max Stendahl, Obama May Play It Safe with AG Pick After GOP Win, LAW360 (Nov. 5, 
2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/591102/obama-may-play-it-safe-with-ag-pick-
after-gop-win. 
 35. Ruth Marcus, Senators, Do Your Job and Confirm Loretta Lynch, WASH. POST (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-delay-over-lynchs-confirmation-isnt-
about-race-or-gender/2015/03/24/1bdefa2e-d233-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html; Daniel 
Wilson, Senate Confirms Lynch as Attorney General, LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/646969/breaking-senate-confirms-lynch-as-attorney-general. 
Lynch’s 2014 nomination was returned to President Obama in December; he renominated her 
at the start of 2015.  
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stalled human trafficking legislation passed.36 Then, there was debate 
on the budget before the Senate left for a two-week recess.37 In the 
middle of the recess, she had waited longer than other nominees to 
the cabinet in the past three administrations to be confirmed.38 
Although we have some snapshots, we do not have a systematic 
handle on how the agency and judicial confirmation process changed 
when the Senate shifted its rules in November 2013.39 Using a 
comprehensive new database covering almost all civilian nominations 
between January 1981 and December 2014, this Article offers an 
empirical assessment of that change, along with other aspects of the 
Senate’s role in staffing important positions. 
There are several key findings. First, almost a quarter of 
submitted nominations between 1981 and 2014 were not confirmed, 
with higher failure rates for Presidents George W. Bush and Obama. 
Nominations to courts of appeals and independent regulatory 
commissions (IRCs) had much higher failure rates than did those to 
other entities. Second, for confirmed nominations, the time to 
confirmation has been increasing. Although the average time from 
nomination to confirmation in the dataset was 88.5 days, it was 127.2 
days for President Obama. Failure rates of nominations did not 
always go hand in hand with longer confirmation delays for successful 
nominations. Although considerably more nominations failed during 
periods of divided government (26 percent compared to 21 percent 
when the same party controlled the Senate and the White House), 
 
 36. Emmarie Huetteman, Human Trafficking Bill Stands in Way of Pick for Attorney 
General, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2015, at A14.  
 37. See Mike DeBonis, With a Seemingly Innocuous Bill, Senate Manages to Tie Itself In 
Knots, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-a-seemingly-
innocuous-bill-senate-manages-to-tie-itself-in-knots/2015/03/16/8bd62ca2-cc08-11e4-8a46-
b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html. 
 38. See Al Kamen & Colby Itkowitz, Loretta Lynch to Lead Pack—Going Three White 
Houses Back—of Waiters, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/loretta-lynch-to-lead-pack--going-three-white-houses-back--of-waiters/2015/03/26/95601
9d8-d3f9-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html. 
 39. There has been some media coverage of judicial nominations. See, e.g., Al Kamen & 
Paul Kane, Did ‘Nuclear Option’ Boost Obama’s Judicial Appointments?, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/12/17/did-nuclear-option-
boost-obamas-judicial-appointments. In addition, I have recently learned of some academic 
research conducted independently of this study. See Christina L. Boyd, Michael S. Lynch, and 
Anthony J. Madonna, Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on 
Judicial Nominations (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (finding that “while post-nuclear nominees are not significantly more liberal, they are 
being confirmed more often and more quickly”).  
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successful nominations took only four days longer, on average, to 
confirm when different parties controlled the Senate and the White 
House. Third, comparing the year after the change to the filibuster 
rules to the year before, confirmation times for nominations to the 
courts decreased but jumped for all types of agencies. For many 
agency positions, however, significantly fewer nominations failed 
after the voting change. Even so, these improvements—to the 
confirmation rates for both agency and judicial nominees and to the 
confirmation pace for judicial picks—are relative: across all 
nominations as a group, the failure rate was higher and the 
confirmation process was slower, on average, than under preceding 
administrations. Fourth, nearly 30 percent of nominees hailed from 
the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, raising concern that 
the confirmation process may be narrowing the pool of top officials. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a description of 
the new database and the major questions for investigation. Part II 
supplies some key findings, including but not limited to those 
previously highlighted, on failed nominations in the past thirty-four 
years, the length of the confirmation process during that time, and the 
effects of the filibuster change on President Obama’s nominations. 
Part III turns to some possible explanations for this Article’s findings 
and suggests further avenues of investigation. Finally, Part IV briefly 
proposes some reforms and then concludes. Because of data 
limitations, the Article focuses on the Senate’s role once a 
nomination is submitted. Judicial and agency vacancies depend 
critically as well on the President’s role in submitting nominations for 
Senate consideration.40 Nevertheless, there is still much to be learned 
by looking at the role of the Senate in isolation. 
 
 40. See, e.g., Edward-Isaac Dovere & Jennifer Epstein, Empty Jobs Plague Obama 
Administration, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2013/08/barack-obama-administration-staffing-95512.html (noting that “the president’s taking 
his time too”); Josh Rogin, Kerry Blames White House for State Department Vacancies, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/17/kerry-blames-
white-house-for-state-department-vacancies (noting how, during a congressional hearing, 
Secretary of State John Kerry blamed the “White House vetting process” for vacancies in the 
State Department). In other work, I address the White House’s delays in making nominations 
for key positions. See ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING FOR 
LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY AGENCY POSITIONS AND HOW 
TO IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 1–19 (Apr. 2010); O’Connell, supra note 7, at 952–
74; PFIFFNER ET AL., supra note 13; Dwight Ink, Anne Joseph O’Connell, David Lewis, and 
James P. Pfiffner, Strong Executive Leadership Crucial for Policy Implementation, PUB. 
MANAGER, Winter 2012, at 37; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Five Myths about Presidential 
Appointments, WASH. POST, July 21, 2013, at B2. 
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I.  DATA AND QUESTIONS 
This Article uses a new dataset that I have constructed of 
nonroutine civilian nominations41 submitted to the Senate from 
January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2014. Some past work relies on the 
Library of Congress’s online nominations database (THOMAS), 
which covers civilian nominations but goes back only to 1987.42 Other 
past work extends back further in time (and covers a wider time 
period than this Article) but does not cover the same breadth of 
civilian nominations.43 Still other work focuses only on judicial 
nominations.44 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) produces 
comprehensive reports on civilian nominations but typically does so 
 
 41. The dataset thus excludes military nominations. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, “[m]ilitary appointments and promotions make up the majority of 
nominations, approximately 65,000 per two-year Congress, and most are confirmed routinely.” 
ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31980, SENATE CONSIDERATION OF 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS: COMMITTEE AND FLOOR PROCEDURE 1 (2015). The dataset 
also excludes civilian nominations that are routine promotions. See infra note 52 and 
accompanying text.  
 42. See, e.g., Matthew M. Dull, Patrick Roberts, Sang Ok Choi & Michael Keeney, 
Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: Politics, Policy, and Professionalism in Federal Agency 
Leadership, 1989–2009 (American Political Science Association Toronto Meeting Paper, Sept. 2, 
2009) (relying on THOMAS for confirmation data); Ian Ostrander, The Logic of Collective 
Inaction: Senatorial Delay in Executive Nominations (Mar. 31, 2011) (unpublished mauscript) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (analyzing 7000 nominations from THOMAS to executive 
agencies from 1987 to 2010).  
 43. See, e.g., Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to 
Executive Branch Nominations, 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1132 (1999) (covering 
“more than 3500 nominations to positions in domestic executive branch agencies from the 49th 
to the 104th Senates (1885–1996)” and excluding the Departments of Defense, the State 
Department, and IRCs and independent regulatory boards). 
 44. See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal 
Judges, 1947–1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190, 192–94 (2002) (analyzing confirmation process for 
nominations to federal appellate courts between 1947 and 1998); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. 
Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 259, 
267 (2002) (examining over 1600 judicial nominations between 1969 and 1998); Lisa M. Holmes, 
Salmon A. Shomade & Roger E. Hartley, The Confirmation Obstacle Course: Signaling 
Opposition Through Delay, 33 AM. REV. POLITICS 23, 33 (2012) (examining 1800 nominations 
for district and circuit court judgeships between 1977 and 2010); David C. Nixon & David L. 
Goss, Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals, 29 AM. POL. RES. 246, 
251 (2001) (examining vacancy delays (from opening to confirmation, rather than by 
nomination) for 548 openings on the federal appellate courts from 1892 to 1994); Nancy 
Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest 
Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1030 (2008) 
(assessing confirmation delays in nominations to federal courts of appeals from 1985 to 2004). 
Remapping Debate has an online tool that allows users to track and compare recent judicial 
vacancies. See Judicial Vacancies: Show Us the Numbers, REMAPPING DEBATE (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.remappingdebate.org/map-data-tool/judicial-vacancies-show-us-numbers?.  
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only for a particular Congress.45 Some interest groups and think tanks 
track nominations.46 The work most similar to this Article in scope 
 
 45. See MAEVE P. CAREY, MICHAEL W. GREENE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42932, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN 
INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE 111TH CONGRESS (2013); MAEVE P. 
CAREY & HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41776, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES DURING 
THE 110TH CONGRESS (2011); ROGELIO GARCIA & HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL30564, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT 
AND OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE 106TH CONGRESS, 1999–2000 (2001); ROGELIO GARCIA, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30124, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS 
IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES, 105TH CONGRESS, 1997–1998 (1999); ROGELIO 
GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 96-985 GOV, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES, 104TH CONGRESS (1996); 
ROGELIO GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 94-473, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES, 103RD 
CONGRESS (1994); ROGELIO GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30476, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS ON REGULATORY AND OTHER COLLEGIAL 
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, 106TH CONGRESS (2001); ROGELIO GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., REPORT NO. 96-271, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS ON 
REGULATORY AND OTHER COLLEGIAL BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, 104TH CONGRESS (1996); 
ROGELIO GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 94-628, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS ON REGULATORY AND OTHER COLLEGIAL 
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, 103RD CONGRESS (1994); HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL31677, FILLING PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED, SENATE-CONFIRMED POSITIONS IN 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2004); HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL31346, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENTS DURING THE 107TH CONGRESS, 2001–2002 (2003); HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL30910, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS ON 
REGULATORY AND OTHER COLLEGIAL BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, 107TH CONGRESS (2003); 
HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41463, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS ON REGULATORY AND OTHER COLLEGIAL 
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, 110TH CONGRESS (2010); HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41497, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS, 2007–2008 (2010); BARRY J. 
MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42556, NOMINATIONS TO U.S. CIRCUIT AND 
DISTRICT COURTS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA DURING THE 111TH AND 112TH CONGRESSES (2012); 
Memorandum from Maeve Carey & Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., to Senator Tom 
Coburn, Presidential Appointments and Nominations Data from the 111th and 112th 
Congresses (May 20, 2011). These reports generally detail by agency the number of nominations 
submitted, the outcome of those nominations (whether confirmed, withdrawn, or returned), and 
the days required to confirm each successful nomination. There are some CRS reports that 
cover a longer time period. See ROGELIO GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 93-
464 GOV, SENATE ACTION ON NOMINATIONS TO POLICY POSITIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH, 1981–1992 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE ACTION] (providing the percentage of 
confirmed nominations, returned nominations, and withdrawn nominations for three big 
categories: departments, agencies, and commissions); HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONG 
RESEARCH SERV., R40119, FILLING ADVICE AND CONSENT POSITIONS AT THE OUTSET OF A 
NEW ADMINISTRATION (2010) (examining appointments to executive-branch agencies at the 
start of an administration, from President Reagan to President Obama) [hereinafter FILLING 
ADVICE AND CONSENT POSITIONS]; BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43058, 
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looks at nominations to federal courts, executive agencies, and IRCs 
from 1965 to 2008.47 
The comprehensive dataset allows examination of a range of 
topics, including nominations that fail to get confirmed, the 
confirmation process for nominations that succeed, and the 2013 
change in Senate voting practices. Section A describes the dataset in 
more detail. Section B outlines the major areas of inquiry. 
A. Data Description 
Using information from congress.gov, the new dataset covers 
most civilian nominations submitted to the Senate from January 1, 
1981, through December 31, 2014.48 There are separate fields for the 
nominee’s name, the description of the nomination (including the 
nominee’s residence, the position and the agency or court), the date 
the nomination was received, the relevant Senate committee (if any), 
the final action taken on the nomination, and the date of that last 
action. Thus, the observations are individual nominations.49 For 
example, if an individual is nominated for a particular position and 
the nomination is still pending when the Senate adjourns or recesses 
for more than thirty days, the nomination under Senate rules will be 
returned to the President.50 In the dataset, that nomination will show 
a return to the President as its final action. If the President then 
nominates the individual for the position again and the Senate 
 
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST-TERM U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: AN 
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON WITH PRESIDENTS SINCE REAGAN (2013) (comparing judicial 
nominations in Presidents’ first terms from Reagan to Obama) [hereinafter FIRST-TERM]; 
DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT NO. 98-510, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS BY 
PRESIDENT CLINTON DURING THE 103RD-106TH CONGRESSES (2006) (looking at judicial 
nominations over four sessions of Congress). 
 46. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY: JUDICIAL 
SELECTION DURING THE REMAINDER OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST TERM (2012),  
available at http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/state-of-the-judiciary-may-2012.pdf; 
BROOKINGS INST., PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/
presidential-appointments#/? (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (collecting news articles and research on 
presidential appointments).  
 47. Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher & Glen S. Krutz, Malign Neglect: Evidence that Delay 
Has Become the Primary Method of Defeating Presidential Appointments, 36 CONG. & 
PRESIDENCY 226, 232 (2009) (examining 2610 nominations). This Article considers more recent 
nominations, including those occurring after the 2013 change in Senate voting practices. 
 48. For more detailed information, see infra Data Appendix. 
 49. Others follow this approach. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 39, at 9 n.12. 
 50. S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXXI, par. 6, 
available at http://www.rules.senate.gov (follow “Standing Rules of the Senate” hyperlink; then 
follow “Executive Session Proceedings on Nominations” hyperlink).  
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confirms her (for instance, by a recorded vote), that nomination will 
be the second in the dataset for this individual and position, and the 
second nomination will show a confirmation outcome by a recorded 
vote (and the vote) as its final action. 
The dataset includes all judicial nominations to district courts, 
courts of appeals, the Supreme Court, and non–Article III courts (for 
example, the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims); all 
nominations to cabinet departments and agencies within them; all 
nominations to freestanding executive agencies (for example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency); all nominations to full-time IRCs 
and independent regulatory boards (for example, the National Labor 
Relations Board); and all nominations to quasi-agencies and other 
entities (for example, Member of the Board of Directors for Amtrak, 
U.S. Governor for the International Monetary Fund, and the 
President of the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank). For 
some of the analysis, where noted, I exclude nominations for 
ambassador and special representative positions for the State 
Department and nominations for U.S. Marshals and U.S. Attorneys 
in the Justice Department.51 The dataset does not include (by choice) 
routine nominations needed for promotions within the Foreign 
Service, Public Health Service, and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, though it does include individual 
nominations for career ambassadors and for Surgeon General.52 
After these and other deletions described in the Data Appendix, 
there are 15,972 observations, each representing a submitted 
nomination for a particular person that led to either confirmation or 
failure (including being returned to or withdrawn by the President).53 
For each observation, there is a start date to the process (the date on 
which the nomination was submitted to the Senate) and an end date 
to the process (the date on which the nomination was confirmed or 
failed). The type of confirmation (for example, voice vote or recorded 
 
 51. If these nominations are included, they overwhelm the other nominations because they 
are so numerous, and therefore, skew the dataset.  
 52. These positions form the majority of civilian nominations submitted to the Senate, see 
Christopher J. Deering, Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: The Senate’s Role in the 
Appointments Process, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS 100, 103 (G. Calvin MacKenzie ed., 1987), but 
are considered routine (rather than critical) policy jobs. Id. Modern studies therefore typically 
do not include them. 
 53. Some official nominations included multiple individuals, typically to a board of 
directors or representatives to an international entity. I broke these “group” records into 
individual observations.  
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vote) or failure and the duration of the process are also included. 
From the start date, each nomination is assigned to a President, an 
institutional conflict (between the White House and Senate) status,54 
and a filibuster rule status.55 
If it is a judicial nomination, there is information on the level of 
federal court and, if for a court of appeal, the particular court (for 
example, the D.C. Circuit). If it is a nonjudicial nomination there is 
information on the position (for example, Assistant Secretary, 
General Counsel), the agency (for example, the EPA), and the type 
of agency (for example, Cabinet Department, Executive Agency, IRC 
or Board). The Cabinet Department category excludes nominations 
for U.S. Marshal, U.S. Attorney, Ambassador, and U.S. 
Representative positions.56 
B. Questions for Investigation 
This Article investigates three major areas: nominations that fail 
to get confirmed, the confirmation process for nominations that 
succeed, and the 2013 change in Senate voting practices on 
nominations. The first two areas provide important information 
separate from filibuster reform and are also helpful in analyzing the 
reform. 
First, not all nominations to the Senate are confirmed. Some are 
returned to the President, some are withdrawn by the President, and 
a few are voted down. What percentage of nominations from 1981 
through 2014 failed? How did failure vary by President; the presence 
of institutional conflict; the type of court or agency, position, and 
Senate committee; and by timing within an administration? 
Second, successful nominations take time to be confirmed. What 
was the average time of confirmation for nominations from 1981 
through 2014? How did that average vary by President, the presence 
of institutional conflict; the type of court or agency, position, and 
Senate committee; and by timing within an administration? How did 
failure and confirmation delay interact? Were some nominations 
 
 54. If the Senate and White House are controlled by different parties, the nomination is 
assigned to divided government. 
 55. For much of the analysis, the nomination is classified as “prereform” if it was submitted 
to the Senate in the year prior to the change, “postreform” if submitted in the year after and 
“other” otherwise. For some analysis, the “prereform” category included any nomination made 
by President Obama (in other words, since January 2009) before the change in voting rules.  
 56. See infra Data Appendix for more information on how I created all these variables. 
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more likely both to fail and to take longer to succeed? Or did failure 
and confirmation delay work as substitutes for some nominations? 
Third, the November 21, 2013 action in the Senate shifted the 
rules for Senate voting on nominations. Did the change speed up 
confirmations? Did it make nominations more likely to succeed? 
How do the effects vary by the type of court or agency, position, and 
Senate committee? 
The next two Parts attempt to provide some answers to these 
questions. 
II.  PATTERNS AND ANALYSIS 
The analysis in this Part is rather straightforward. With the new 
dataset I have constructed, my primary objective is to describe 
various features of the confirmation process. This Part turns first to 
failed nominations, then to confirmed nominations, and finally to 
reform of the filibuster rule. Because much political science research 
aims to tell some sort of causal story, such work often lacks 
descriptive detail. In the next Part, I consider more aggregate and 
predictive approaches to nomination failure and confirmation length. 
A. Failed Nominations 
Outside of studies of the Supreme Court, scholars (including 
myself) and commentators often focus on who is selected or on 
confirmation delays, explicitly or implicitly assuming that all 
nominations will succeed.57 But nominations fail—in other words, 
 
 57. See, e.g., Deering, supra note 52, at 112 (showing mean and median confirmation lags 
from President Johnson to President Reagan); Dull et al., supra note 42, at 436 (focusing on 
confirmation times and appointee tenure of successful nominations); Thomas H. Hammond & 
Jeffrey S. Hill, Deference or Preference? Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential 
Nominees to Administrative Agencies, 5 J. THEORETICAL POL. 23, 23 (1993) (“Presidential 
nominees for executive office are almost always confirmed by the Senate.”); O’Connell, supra 
note 7, at 967 n.241 (noting that analysis excluded failed nominations and raising concerns); 
Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The President, 
Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 269, 299 (2000) (testing a model of political 
influence over the National Labor Relations Board that predicts that “no nominees are 
rejected”). But see G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
175–77 (1981) (discussing failed nominations); SENATE ACTION, supra note 45, at 2–4 (reporting 
near 13 percent failure rate of approximately 2000 executive branch nominations between 1981 
and 1992 and noting that the Senate voted down only one of those nominations); BARRY J. 
MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40470, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT 
NOMINATIONS: SENATE REJECTIONS AND COMMITTEE VOTES OTHER THAN TO REPORT 
FAVORABLY, 1939–2013, at 6–8 (2014) (examining the 11 nominees from 1973 to 2013 who 
“received votes from the Senate Judiciary Committee other than to report favorably” and 
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they fail to get confirmed. Specifically, they may be voted down, they 
may be withdrawn, or they may be returned to the President. Of all 
nominations received by the Senate from 1981 to 2014, 22.9 percent 
failed. Most of these (19.7 percent of the nominations) were returned 
to the President, with all but a handful of the remaining nominations 
being withdrawn by the President (3.2 percent of the nominations).58 
The failure rate is generally rising by administration: of the 
nominations submitted by President Reagan, 17.5 percent failed; by 
President George H.W. Bush, 17 percent failed; by President Clinton, 
 
noting that only one was voted down by the full Senate); Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 
244–45 (noting that “confirmation rates [for judicial nominations] dip[ped] below 50 percent in 
some recent Congresses); Bond et al., supra note 47, at 232 (examining failure rates and 
confirmation delays of judicial and agency nominations in the 1965–2008 period); Hartley & 
Holmes, supra note 44, at 269–70 (examining failure rates of judicial nominations from 1969 to 
1998 and finding them low, though increasing over time); Holmes et al., supra note 44, at 33 
(examining failure rates and confirmation delays of judicial nominees at committee and full-
Senate stages); James D. King & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Senate Confirmation of 
Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President, 28 SOC. SCI. J. 189, 192–95 
(1991) (looking at rejected and withdrawn nominations to cabinet level posts from President 
Truman to President George H.W. Bush); Glen S. Krutz, Richard Fleisher & Jon R. Bond, 
From Abe Fortas to Zöe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate, 92 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 871, 874 (1998) (examining the less than 5 percent of “important nominations” 
that failed between 1965 and 1994); McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1125–26 
(examining low failure rates of executive-agency nominations during the 1885–1996 period but 
noting “the rate of failures has risen substantially over the past 30 years”); Elliot E. Slotnick & 
Sheldon Goldman, Congress and the Courts: A Case of Casting, in GREAT THEATRE: THE 
AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S, at 197, 214–15 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. 
Patterson eds., 1998) (noting failed judicial nominations by President Clinton); Gilbert David 
Nuñez, Polarization and Presidential Nominations: The Case of Contested Presidential 
Nominations in Increasingly Polarized Times (American Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting Paper, Aug. 28, 2014) (examining failure rates from 1965 to 2008); Anthony Madonna 
& Ian Ostrander, Decommissioned Commissions: Holdover Capacity, Confirmation Dynamics 
and Independent Regulatory Commissions 5 (Nov. 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (noting “confirmation rate of just under 70%” for nominations to 
regulatory boards and commissions between 1987 and 2010); Ostrander, supra note 42, at 22 
(examining failed and censored nominations). Some work implicitly considers failed 
nominations as it studies the entire vacancy period. See, e.g., Matthew Dull & Patrick S. 
Roberts, Continuity, Competence, and the Succession of Senate-Confirmed Agency Appointees, 
1989–2009, 39 PRES. STUDIES Q. 432, 435–36 (2009); Nixon & Goss, supra note 44, at 246 
(examining vacancy durations but noting that “lower court nominees are very rarely rejected”); 
O’Connell, supra note 7, at 954–55; Kevin M. Scott & Philip Habel, The Nomination and 
Confirmation of Federal Judges: An Integrated Approach (American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting Paper, Aug. 31, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300558.  
 58. For withdrawals, the nominee typically asks the President to withdraw the nomination, 
though the White House can pull a nomination on its own. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Long After 
Nomination an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A16 (noting “[i]t was 
not clear whether Ms. Johnsen or the White House had made the decision to pull her 
nomination”). 
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22.9 percent failed; by President George W. Bush, 26.4 percent failed; 
and by President Obama (through 2014), 28.0 percent failed. More 
nominations failed when different parties controlled a majority of the 
Senate and the White House (25.8 percent) than when the same party 
had control of both (20.6 percent). These rates are much higher than 
those for older administrations.59 
Table 1 breaks down failed nominations by type of court and 
agency. 
Table 1. Failure Rates by Type of Entity, 1981–2014 
Type of Organization Failure Rates (%) 
 District Court 23.7 
Court of Appeals  40.8 
Supreme Court 20.0 
Non–Article III Court 22.2 
Cabinet Department 18.8 
White House Agency 21.4 
Executive Agency 20.5 




Nominations to courts of appeals and IRCs were more likely to 
fail. On the judicial side, this finding accords with courts of appeals 
having more authority than district courts—specifically, the appellate 
courts set precedent for the district courts and for other appellate 
panels in their circuit.60 This explanation would predict that Supreme 
Court nominations would fail more often than courts of appeals 
nominations, but my data show the opposite to be true. To be fair, the 
number of Supreme Court nominations in the period studied is quite 
small.61 The President could also select more moderate nominees for 
 
 59. See Bond et al., supra note 47, at 229 (seeing less than a 10 percent failure rate in the 
1965–2008 period); Krutz et al., supra note 57, at 871 (finding a failure rate of under 5 percent in 
“important nominations” between 1965 and 1994); McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 
1126 (finding a failure rate of 4.4 percent for executive agencies in the 1885–1996 period). 
 60.  See Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQUETTE L. REV. 
755, 755–56 (1993). 
 61. The failure rate does seem representative, however, of a longer time period. See 
RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33247, SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, 1789–2011, at 1 (2011) (noting 
that 36 of 160 Supreme Court nominations between 1789 and 2010 were not confirmed).  
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the Supreme Court.62 In addition, there may have been more pressure 
in recent decades for Senators to defer (at least in the final vote) to 
presidential picks for the Supreme Court (than to defer to appellate 
court selections), and this pressure may have swamped their concern 
over the Supreme Court’s power.63 The courts of appeals with more 
than 40 percent failed nominations were the D.C. Circuit (53.2 
percent); the Fourth Circuit (56.6 percent); the Fifth Circuit (47.9 
percent); the Sixth Circuit (49.1 percent); the Ninth Circuit (46.2 
percent); and the Eleventh Circuit (40.7 percent).64 
On the agency side, this result matches with the view that 
Congress wields more power over IRCs than over agencies more 
under the control of the President.65 The IRCs with more than 30 
percent failed nominations were the Federal Election Commission 
(38 percent); the Federal Housing Financial Board (55.9 percent); the 
Federal Trade Commission (30.2 percent); the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (39.1 percent); the International Trade Commission 
(39.6 percent); the National Labor Relations Board (59.1 percent); 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (52.6 
percent); and the Surface Transportation Board (35.3 percent). 
Table 2 breaks down failed nominations by position. 
  
 
 62. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 44, at 190–91. 
 63. Cf. Joel B. Grossman & Stephen L. Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court 
Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (“Although lower court judgeships 
represent prime patronage opportunities for senators of the President’s party, Supreme Court 
nominations have long been widely accepted as a presidential prerogative.”). 
 64. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 246 (finding higher failure rates for the same 
courts of appeals). 
 65. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and 
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1180 (2009). 
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Table 2. Failure Rates by Type of Position, 1981–2014 
Type of Position Failure Rates (%) 
 Ambassador 10.8 
U.S. Marshal 10.0 
U.S. Attorney 11.7 
General Counsel 24.3 
Inspector General 23.9 
Chief Financial Officer 18.8 
Administrator 21.4 
Director  23.2 
Assistant Secretary  18.1 
Under Secretary  17.8 
Deputy Secretary  16.3 
Secretary  6.3 
Commissioner (non-advisory) 28.5 
Board Member (non-advisory) 34.6 
Council Member 30.1 
 
There is considerable overlap between the non-advisory 
Commissioner and Board Member categories (which include 
chairpersons) with the IRC or Board category in Table 1, as such 
agencies typically do not have multiple layers of Senate-confirmed 
appointees. Table 2 splits, for example, nominations for General 
Counsel and Board Member at the National Labor Relations Board 
into two categories. Nominations for Ambassador, U.S. Marshal, U.S. 
Attorney, and Cabinet Secretary were noticeably less likely to fail 
overall. 
Table 3 breaks down failed nominations by Senate committee. 
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Table 3. Failure Rates by Senate Committee, 1981–2014 
Committee Failure Rates (%) 
Agriculture 18.2 







Foreign Relations 16.2 
Governmental Affairs 31.9 






Small Business 29.4 
Veterans’ Affairs 16.5 
 
Compared to nominations outside of a particular committee, the 
following committees had failure percentages that were more than 
five points lower: Armed Services; Budget (though Budget had very 
few nominations, all of which were to the Office of Management and 
Budget); Foreign Relations; Intelligence; and Veterans’ Affairs. 
Again, comparing to nominations outside of a particular committee, 
the following committees had failure percentages that were more than 
five points higher: Government Affairs/Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs; Labor and Human Resources/Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions; “None” where no committee is 
listed; Rules and Administration; and Small Business/Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship.66 
 
 66. For more information on the None category, which became much more prevalent after 
the Senate agreed in 2011 that certain nominations would be considered without being referred 
to a Committee, see infra Data Appendix, Section D. The Budget Committee received joint 
jurisdiction over nominations for the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of 
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Table 4 separates failure rates by time within the administration. 
Table 4. Failure Rates by Time in Administration, 1981–2014 
Time in Administration Failure Rates (%) 
 First Year 9.7 
Second Year 23.9 
Third Year 16.3 
Fourth Year 38.5 
Fifth Year 22.8 
Sixth Year 26.4 
Seventh Year 18.5 
Eighth Year 39.6 
 
The lowest failure rate was in the President’s first year. Failure 
rates were higher in the second year of a particular Congress, 
compared to the first year, and were highest in the final year of a 
President’s term. The pattern on even-numbered years did not hold 
for President Obama in 2013 and 2014, as discussed in Part C, infra. 
To see both the timing within the administration and which 
administration is making the nomination, you can examine the failure 
rate by nomination year. Figure 1 displays the failure rate of district 
court and appellate court nominations, while Figure 2 shows the 




Management and Budget, starting with the 109th Congress. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & 
JERRY W. MANSFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE 
POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 
13 n.46 (2012). The Senate Resolution granting the joint jurisdiction requires that “if one 
committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must report within 30 calendar 
days session, or be automatically discharged.” Id.  
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Figure 1. Failure Rates for District and Appellate Court Nominations, 
1981–2014 
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Figure 2. Failure Rates for Ambassador and Assistant Secretary 
Nominations, 1981–2014 
 
In sum, many nominations are not confirmed. To be fair, the 
dataset treats every nomination sent to the Senate as an individual 
nomination. So if a President nominates x and the nomination is 
returned to the President and then the President renominates x, and x 
is later confirmed, that information appears as two records in the 
dataset: one nomination that failed and one nomination that was 
confirmed. In such cases, the initial failures still have consequences. 
Most notably, they take time. The average duration of a failed 
nomination (from the receipt of the nomination to the return to or 
withdrawal by) the President was 179.7 days. The typical failed 
nomination was therefore not one that lacked any chance to succeed; 
six months provides sufficient time for the Senate to hold a hearing 
and decide whether to confirm the nomination.67 
 
 67. “Last-minute” nominations are not driving the results here. To be sure, the failure rate 
of nominations submitted in the final two months of a particular Congress was much higher 
(75.5 percent) than nominations submitted at other times (21.6 percent). But only 392 
nominations between 1981 and 2014 were submitted during that period. See infra Data 
Appendix, Section E.  
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In addition, cases of multiple nominations of the same person are 
not typical, at least to agency positions.68 When a nomination fails, the 
President is more likely not to submit the nomination again, either 
because the White House or the nominee decides not to face the 
Senate again. Even if the nomination is resubmitted, the process in 
the Senate again starts at the beginning.69 Nevertheless, for a 
comprehensive analysis of failure rates it would be important to pair 
these results with studies on the overall vacancy period. 
We can no longer keep the “presumption of success”70 when it 
comes to nominations, particularly those to agency positions. If a 
meaningful number of important nominations fail in modern 
administrations, it is not enough to consider only those nominations 
that are confirmed. Political scientists often treat nominations that are 
returned to the President as “censored” in their empirical analyses.71 
But those censored nominations become failed nominations if the 
President does not resubmit the nominations in the next Senate. And 
even if the President does resubmit and the nominations are 
eventually confirmed, they nonetheless failed initially.72 In addition, 
the Senate likes to include thousands of routine nominations, such as 
promotions within the Foreign Service and Public Health Service, to 
inflate its confirmation figures.73 But these routine nominations are 
 
 68. See SENATE ACTION, supra note 45, at 4. Presidents do seem to renominate more 
individuals for judgeships. See RUTKUS, supra note 45, at i (noting that most returned judicial 
nominations under President Clinton were “later renominated and ultimately confirmed”); 
Binder & Maltzman, supra note 44, at 194 (noting that “93 percent of judicial nominees are 
eventually confirmed”); Daniel Wilson, Obama Renominates 54 Judges After GOP Lets Picks 
Lapse, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/499382/obama-
renominates-54-judges-after-gop-lets-picks-lapse (noting renominations). Research that 
examines the period between the departure of one official and the start of the next person gets 
around this problem. See Nixon & Goss, supra note 44, at 246; O’Connell, supra note 7, at 954–
55. The dataset here does not contain departure dates. Nevertheless, because it does identify the 
persons being nominated, future research could determine failure rates that account for 
renominations. 
 69. See Jeremy W. Peters, White House Steps Up Effort to Confirm Federal Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2014, at A13 (“By refusing to consent to votes last year, they forced Mr. Obama 
to resubmit a slate of nominees, restarting a cumbersome process that required them all to be 
nominated and processed again.”). 
 70. See Krutz et al., supra note 57, at 871. 
 71. See, e.g., Binder & Maltzman, supra note 44, at 192 n.3; Ostrander, supra note 42, at 22, 
32. 
 72. See Ostrander, supra note 25, at 6 (treating returned nominations as failures). 
 73. See U.S. SENATE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS, 138 
CONG. REC. 1348, 1349 (Feb. 4, 1992, report Dec. 18, 1991) (noting that in the last ten years the 
Senate has confirmed 97 percent of the 600,000 nominations it received). 
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generally not the same as policy-relevant nominations such as 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation or Deputy Secretary. Failure is as 
important to understand as delay. 
B. Confirmation Process 
Those nominations that do not fail take time to succeed. On 
average, from 1981 through 2014, successful nominations took 88.5 
days to be confirmed. This figure has been increasing over the past 
five administrations: for successful nominations submitted by 
President Reagan, confirmation took on average 59.4 days; by 
President George H.W. Bush, 67.3 days; by President Clinton, 91.8 
days; by President George W. Bush, 97.4 days; and by President 
Obama (through 2014), 127.2 days. Interestingly, whether the 
nomination was submitted when the same party controlled the Senate 
and the White House does not matter much: confirmed nominations 
took 86.9 days in unified government (looking only at the Senate) and 
90.7 days in divided government.74 Figure 3 shows the histogram and 
kernel density plot of confirmation delays for all successful 
nominations in the dataset. Because nominations are almost always 
returned at the end of a particular term of Congress, there are no 
extreme outliers, which makes looking at means sensible. 
  
 
 74. Others have found similar results with less data. See, e.g., HOGUE ET AL., FILLING 
ADVICE AND CONSENT POSITIONS, supra note 45, at i, 17 (examining appointments to executive 
branch agencies at the start of an administration, from President Reagan to President Obama 
and finding that “the period of Senate consideration has . . . grown longer”); PAUL C. LIGHT & 
VIRGINIA L. THOMAS, THE MERIT AND REPUTATION OF AN ADMINISTRATION: PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTEES ON THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, at 4, 12 (Apr. 2000) (finding through surveys 
increased confirmation delays); O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 9–10 (seeing increasingly longer 
confirmation times for executive agency nominations); Hartley & Holmes, supra note 44, at 
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Nominations to all courts but the Supreme Court took much 
longer than the average time required to confirm all nominations, 
conditioned on the nominations being confirmed. And nominations 
to IRCs took slightly longer than average to confirm and much longer 
than did nominations to other agencies, again conditioned on the 
nominations being confirmed. 
On the judicial side, these longer confirmation times may reflect 
the greater permanency of these selections. Judicial appointments to 
Article III courts, of course, have lifetime tenure, and appointments 
to non–Article III courts still have terms much longer than a 
presidential administration.75 The courts of appeals for which 
successful nominations took more than 130 days were the Fourth 
Circuit (141 days); the Sixth Circuit (137.9 days); the Ninth Circuit 
(170.6 days); and the Eleventh Circuit (135.8 days). Nominations to 
some appellate courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, had both a much 
higher failure rate and a much longer confirmation process, on 
average; nominations to other courts of appeals, such as the D.C. 
Circuit, had a much higher failure rate but not a meaningfully longer 
(though still longer than the average for all nominations) 
confirmation process. 
On the agency side, as with failed nominations, this finding 
comports with the view that Congress wields more power over IRCs 
than agencies that are more under the control of the President.76 
Nominations to the following IRCs took more than 120 days on 
average, to confirm: the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (134.1 days); the International Trade Commission (145.1 
days); the National Labor Relations Board (129.6 days); and the 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (127.1 days). As with courts, some of 
these agencies (such as the NLRB) had both a higher chance of 
failure and a longer confirmation process. What is more striking are 
the agencies, such as the Federal Housing Finance Board, that had an 
above-average failure rate and below-average confirmation length (or 
vice versa). 
Table 6 breaks down the confirmation length for successful 
nominations by position. 
  
 
 75. For example, judges on the Tax Court have 15-year terms. 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e) (2012). 
 76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
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Table 6. Confirmation Lengths by Type of Position, 1981–2014 
Type of Position Mean Days 
 Ambassador 64.9 
U.S. Marshal 71.6 
U.S. Attorney 61.7 
General Counsel 80.6 
Inspector General 96.2 
Chief Financial Officer 111.3 
Administrator 69.8 
Director  85.7 
Assistant Secretary 78.0 
Under Secretary  72.6 
Deputy Secretary 63.0 
Secretary  21.1 
Commissioner (non-advisory)  91.0 
Board Member (non-advisory) 100.8 
Council Member 112.8 
 
As noted above, there is considerable overlap between the 
nonadvisory Commissioner and Board Member categories (which 
include chairpersons) and the IRC category in Table 5. Nominations 
for Cabinet Secretaries (including the Attorney General and service 
secretaries within the Defense Department) were confirmed very 
quickly. Although their failure rates did not differ from the average, 
successful Inspector General and Chief Financial Officer nominations 
did take longer than the average for all positions to be confirmed. 
Table 7 breaks down confirmation lengths by Senate committee. 
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Table 7. Confirmation Lengths by Senate Committee, 1981–2014 
Committee Mean Days 
 Agriculture 76.7 







Foreign Relations 69.5 
Governmental Affairs 111.2 






Small Business 73.0 
Veterans’ Affairs 99.8 
 
Comparing to nominations outside of a particular committee, 
nominations to the following committees took ten fewer days, on 
average, to confirm: Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Armed 
Services; Foreign Relations; Intelligence; and Small Business/Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship. Again, comparing to nominations 
outside of a particular committee, nominations to the following 
committees took ten days longer, on average, to confirm: 
Government Affairs/Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; 
Judiciary; Labor and Human Resources/Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions; “None” where no committee is listed; Rules and 
Administration; and Veterans’ Affairs. Many of the committees 
identified in the preceding Section had both high failure rates and 
longer confirmation times, or both low failure rates and shorter 
confirmation times, compared to averages. For those committees, in 
other words, failure rates and confirmation delays worked as 
complements. 
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Table 8 examines confirmation delays by time within the 
administration and notes the number of confirmed nominations per 
President in each year. 
Table 8. Confirmation Lengths (and Confirmed Nominations) by 
Time in Administration, 1981–2014 
Time in Administration 
Mean Nominations 
(per President) Mean Days 
 First Year 577.8 63.1 
Second Year 362.6 74.8 
Third Year 412.0 110.9 
Fourth Year 186.6 87.6 
Fifth Year 318.6 97.8 
Sixth Year 257.6 91.2 
Seventh Year 295.8 112.0 
Eighth Year 158.5 86.3 
 
Most striking, the number of nominations and confirmation 
delays are negatively correlated (-0.34). In addition, confirmation 
delays were longest in the third year of a President’s term. Comparing 
Table 8 to Table 4 illustrates that failure rates and confirmation 
delays can move in opposite directions, functioning as substitutes 
instead of complements. 
To see both the timing within the administration and which 
administration made the nominations, you can analyze the 
confirmation delays by nomination year. Figure 4 displays the 
confirmation lengths of successful district court and appellate court 
nominations,77 while Figure 5 shows the confirmation lengths of 




 77. The breaks in the appellate court line mark the years where there were no confirmed 
nominations. 
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Figure 4. Confirmation Lengths for District and Appellate Court 
Nominations, 1981–2014 
 
Figure 5. Confirmation Lengths for Ambassador and Assistant 
Secretary Nominations, 1981–2014 
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In short, for successful nominations, the length of the 
confirmation process has increased over time for almost every 
organization, position, and committee. Again, this Article considers 
renominations separately. If nominations of the same individual to a 
particular position were combined, the failure rate would decline but 
the confirmation delay would increase. 
The mechanism by which a nomination is confirmed can also 
vary—the Senate can agree by unanimous consent, by voice vote, or 
by recorded vote. Not only is the length of the process growing over 
time, but so is the likelihood that a nomination will be confirmed by 
voice or recorded vote. Starting with the Clinton administration, few 
policy-relevant or judicial nominations have been confirmed by 
unanimous consent. And since the George W. Bush administration, 
many more nominations have gone to recorded vote.78 
C. Filibuster Reform 
In November 2013, there was a big change in how the Senate 
treated nominations, making it possible for a majority (rather than 
three-fifths) of Senators to advance a nomination to a vote. From all 
the attention surrounding this change by academics, reporters, and 
politicians, the firm expectation was that nominees would be 
confirmed more quickly,79 or, at the least, would be more likely to be 
confirmed.80 
Comparing the year before the filibuster reform with the year 
after (including December 2014, when then–Majority Leader Harry 
Reid did some fancy footwork to get several dozen nominees 
 
 78. See, e.g., Aebra Coe, Senate Votes to Confirm 12 Federal Judges, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 
2014, 11:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/605542/senate-votes-to-confirm-12-federal-
judges (noting that of the twelve judges confirmed in December, one was by recorded vote and 
eleven were by voice vote); Kamen & Kane, supra note 39; Daniel Wilson, Munger Tolles’ 
Michelle Friedland Confirmed to 9th Cir., LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2014, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/532289/munger-tolles-michelle-friedland-confirmed-to-9th-circ 
(noting that Republicans have “required individual confirmation for judicial and other 
executive nominees, instead of the quicker unanimous consent process”). 
 79. See, e.g., Editorial, Democracy Returns to the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A28 
(citing “a record-setting amount of delay in approving the president’s choices for cabinet 
positions and federal agency posts” as a reason why “the Democrats had little choice but to 
change the filibuster rule”); cf. Ostrander, supra note 25, at 196 (predicting “immediate and 
profound implications”). But see Al Kamen, Filibuster Reform May Not Open Confirmation 
Floodgates, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-
loop/wp/2013/11/22/filibuster-reform-may-not-open-confirmation-floodgates. 
 80. See, e.g., Kamen & Kane, supra note 39. 
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confirmed at the end of the term of Congress),81 nominations 
submitted the year before the change took 105.8 days on average to 
be confirmed; whereas, nominations submitted after the rule change 
required 147.9 days on average. This outcome is the opposite of what 
one might expect, but those averages are conditioned on successful 
nominations. Of nominations submitted the year before the change in 
voting practices, 52.2 percent failed (were returned or withdrawn) 
and of nominations submitted the year after, 34.1 percent failed.82  
There is variation, of course, by organization type, position, and 
committee. For all the tables in this Section, I compare the year 
before the change to the year after.83 Table 9 compares failure rates 
and confirmation delays by type of court and agency. The total 
number of nominations, for each category, is in parentheses in the 
first two columns. 
  
 
 81. See O’Keefe & Dennis, supra note 32. 
 82. If instead of comparing to the year before, one compares to all nominations under 
President Obama before the change (these had a failure rate of 26.5 percent, and the duration of 
successful nominations was 122.6 days), both measures were worse after the reform. Because 
many more nominations are confirmed in the first year of an administration and confirmed 
more quickly, I focus on the year before the Senate change in voting rules. Cf. Boyd et al., supra 
note 39, at 9–12 (comparing judicial nominations the year after the change to all of President 
Obama’s nominations before the change). 
 83. See infra Data Appendix, Section F. 
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Table 9. Failure Rates and Confirmation Length by Type of 
Organization, Pre– and Post–Filibuster Reform 
 
 




Type of Organization Prereform Postreform Prereform Postreform 
 District Court 56.8 (n=74)  20.6 (n=97)  148.6 133.9 
Court of Appeals  40.0 (n=20) 26.7 (n=15) 136.7 131.7 
Cabinet 
Department 
54.6 (n=119) 30.3 (n=132) 84.2 141.5 
White House 
Agency 
25.0 (n=8) 37.5 (n=8) 53.3 133.6 





36.6 (n=41) 14.3 (n=35) 99.6 124.7 
 
The change in Senate process had differing effects on courts and 
agencies. It seems to have sped up confirmation times for the courts 
and slowed down the process for all types of agencies. Similar but not 
identical results hold for the failure of nominations. Many fewer 
judicial nominations failed after the change.84 Although successful 
nominations took longer for cabinet departments and IRCs, more of 
those nominations were confirmed after the change. For executive 
and White House agencies, both measures worsened, though the total 
number of nominations was small. 




 84. Research conducted concurrently (and independently) found similar results for judicial 
nominations, comparing all of President Obama’s nominations before the rule change to those 
nominations made after the change. See Boyd et al., supra note 39, at 12–14. 
 85. If there are no successful nominations, there can be no average confirmation length.  
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Table 10. Failure Rates and Confirmation Length by Position, Pre– 
and Post–Filibuster Reform 
 
 




Type of Position Prereform Postreform Prereform Postreform 
 Ambassador 50.7 (n=73) 17.5 (n=103) 57.3 149.3 
U.S. Marshal 100.0 (n=4) 33.3 (n=6) — 37.0 
U.S. Attorney 60.0 (n=5) 0 (n=7) 114.0 101.0 
General Counsel 58.3 (n=12) 18.2 (n=11) 95.6 131.3 
Inspector General 40.0 (n=5) 50.0 (n=4) 85.7 88.5 
Chief Financial 
Officer 
75.0 (n=8) 33.3 (n=9) 56.0 248.0 
Administrator 28.6 (n=7) 16.7(n=6) 84.2 91.6 
Director  57.9 (n=19) 45.0 (n=20) 114.8 163.8 
Assistant Secretary 58.7 (n=46) 38.2 (n=55) 69.9 152.5 
Under Secretary 82.4 (n=17) 26.9 (n=26) 97.3 108.5 
Deputy Secretary  57.1 (n=7) 0 (n=11) 101.3 80.4 
Secretary  0 (n=10) 25.0 (n=4) 61.2 38.0 
Commissioner (non-
advisory)  
38.5 (n=39) 27.8 (n=36) 115.0 141.0 
Board Member 
(non-advisory) 
31.6 (n=38) 48.3 (n=29) 107.6 173.5 
 
For most of these positions, the failure rate and length of 
confirmation process moved in opposite directions—with fewer 
nominations failing but successful nominations taking longer—after 
the change. Only for Deputy Secretary and U.S. Attorney 
nominations did both measures improve. 
Table 11 compares failure rates and confirmation delays by 
committee. 
  
O'CONNELL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:15 PM 
1680 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1645 
Table 11. Failure Rates and Confirmation Length by Committee, Pre– 
and Post–Filibuster Reform 
 Failure Rates Confirmation Length 
Committee Prereform Postreform Prereform Postreform 
 Agriculture 60.0 (n=5) 25.0 (n=8) 35.0 135.3 
Armed Services  35.0 (n=20) 20.8 (n=24) 104.3 140.8 
Banking 28.6 (n=14) 25.0 (n=16) 108.0 132.1 
Budget 0 (n=2) 0 (n=1) 64.0 38.0 
Commerce 39.3 (n=28) 33.3 (n=30) 88.0 123.9 
Energy 87.5 (n=16) 31.6 (n=19) 66.0 173.5 
Environment 54.6 (n=11) 42.9 (n=14) 120.0 138.9 
Finance 47.1 (n=17) 31.6 (n=19) 94.3 174.1 
Foreign Relations 55.0 (n=120) 24.3 (n=148) 72.6 149.8 
Governmental 
Affairs 
48.0 (n=25) 59.1 (n=22) 104.6 137.4 
Indian Affairs 100 (n=2) 66.7 (n=3) — 171.0 
Intelligence 66.7 (n=3) 0 (n=5) 44.0 55.2 
Judiciary 50.4 (n=121) 26.6 (n=143) 140.1 131.3 
Labor 50.0 (n=34) 42.3 (n=26) 95.9 121.1 
None 58.6 (n=58) 61.9 (n=84) 133.8 240.6 
Rules 50.0 (n=6) 40.0 (n=5) 88.7 216.0 
Small Business no 
nominations 
50.0 (n=2) — 70.0 
Veterans’ Affairs 100 (n=3) 33.3 (n=6) — 86.3 
 
Drawing on work by Professor Jon R. Bond and his coauthors 
for an earlier period, it would be interesting to examine whether the 
rules change affected the point at which nominations are stalling—
specifically, at the committee stage or at the full-Senate stage.86 On 
one hand, the change affected the full-Senate stage, so delays at the 
committee stage could be increasing. On the other hand, there are 
still other devices to delay confirmation votes at the full Senate stage. 
In sum, filibuster reform has had more complicated effects on the 
confirmation process than may have been predicted. The change does 
seem to have uniformly aided judicial nominations: fewer were 
 
 86. See Bond et al., supra note 47, at 234. 
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returned to (or withdrawn by) the President, and successful 
nominations came more quickly. Indeed, in 2014, President Obama 
had more judges confirmed than any other recent President had 
confirmed at the same time in his tenure.87 President Obama’s success 
in judicial nominations is in marked contrast to the prereform failure 
rate of his district- and appellate-court nominations, ranking second 
highest, and the prereform judicial confirmation delays, ranking as 
the longest among recent administrations.88 In addition, when 
President Obama came into the White House only one federal court 
of appeals had a majority of judges nominated by a Democrat; by the 
fall of 2014, nine did.89 But the change had conflicting effects for many 
agencies and agency positions: fewer nominations failed but 
successful nominations took longer to be confirmed. The next Part 
suggests some potential explanations and avenues for research for 
both the judicial and agency findings. 
III.  EXPLANATIONS AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
This Part turns from the descriptive to the explanatory and 
suggests avenues for additional research. Section A examines 
nomination failure and confirmation delays more generally and 
analyzes the likelihood of failure within the dataset constructed here. 
Section B considers possible reasons for the outcomes observed in the 
year after filibuster reform. Section C pivots the focus to the 
nomination stage (from the confirmation perspective generally taken 
in the Article). 
A. Explanations for Nomination Failure and Confirmation Delays 
Previous work in political science has examined the relative 
influence of various factors on nomination failure and confirmation 
delay.90 Research is more extensive on the latter than the former. On 
 
 87. See Kamen & Kane, supra note 39. 
 88. See FIRST-TERM, supra note 45, at 10, 20.  
 89. See Jeremy W. Peters, Eye on Legacy, Obama Shapes Appeals Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2014, at A1, A22. 
 90. This Article focuses on empirical work. There is also purely theoretical research. See, 
e.g., Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential 
Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 91, 91 (2000) (using a model 
to examine “conditions under which senators will constrain presidential appointments to 
independent agency boards”); Michael A. Bailey & Matthew L. Spitzer, Appointing Extremists 
(Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568129 (developing 
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confirmation delay, empirical studies have demonstrated that election 
years,91 divided government,92 polarization of the Senate,93 a less 
friendly relationship between the President and home-state Senators 
(for judicial picks),94 more conflictual Senate oversight committees,95 
committee (or Senate) extremity (compared to the President),96 
Department of Justice positions,97 positions in agencies with 
ideological preferences opposing the President’s,98 positions on 
collegial boards and IRCs,99 “[h]ighly contentious positions,”100 
opposite party replacements on courts,101 and opposition by interest 
groups102are linked to slower confirmation times. In addition, higher-
level agency positions,103 lower-level court positions,104 Department of 
Agriculture positions,105 nominations earlier in an administration,106 
 
a game theory model of both nomination and confirmation for the Supreme Court that takes 
into account uncertainty of the nominee’s preferences).  
 91. See Ostrander, supra note 25, at 122. 
 92. See Hartley & Holmes, supra note 44, at 278 (noting divided government’s role); 
McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1138. But see Ostrander, supra note 42, at 24 (failing to 
find connection). 
 93. See Bond et al., supra note 47, at 226; McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1138; 
Ostrander, supra note 42, at 23. 
 94. See Holmes et al., supra note 44, at 29. 
 95. See Dull et al., supra note 42, at 12, 14 (using coding from survey of committee 
members and others to identity low, medium and high conflict of issues handled by relevant 
committee). 
 96. See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Hitting the Ground Running: The Politics of 
Presidential Appointments in Transition, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FORGING THE PRESIDENCY 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 339, 350 (analyzing committee extremity compared to the 
President); Jinhee Jo, Now or Later? A Dynamic Analysis of Presidential Appointments, at 30–
31 (Nov. 2011) (using filibuster pivot of Senate to examine confirmation delays of nominations 
to appellate courts). 
 97. See McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1138. 
 98. See Ostrander, supra note 42, at 23. 
 99. See SENATE ACTION, supra note 45, at 5; Ostrander, supra note 42, at 23. 
 100. See Dull et al., supra note 42, at 1, 14 (defining such positions as those in redistributive 
and regulatory agencies). 
 101. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate 
Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793, 797 (1993) (finding higher failure rate for opposite party 
replacements). 
 102. See Holmes et al., supra note 44, at 38; Scherer et al., supra note 44, at 1037. 
 103. See McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1138; Dull et al., supra note 42, at 14. 
 104. See Hartley & Holmes, supra note 44, at 275. 
 105. See McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1138. 
 106. See Garland A. Allison, Delays in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80 
JUDICATURE 8, 10–11 (1996) (“A president would find it in his interest to fill all vacancies as 
quickly and as early in the term as possible.”); Dull et al., supra note 42, at 15; Holmes et al., 
supra note 44, at 38 (finding faster process for district-court and circuit-court nominees at the 
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higher presidential approval,107 judicial picks with higher American 
Bar Association ratings,108 and nominations to independent agencies 
with “holdover capacity”109 are connected to faster confirmation 
times. On nomination failure, studies have shown that election 
years,110 positions in agencies with ideological preferences opposing 
the President’s,111 attempts to “portray a nominee in a negative 
light,”112 media coverage,113 the ability to shift the ideological balance 
of a court,114 divided government,115 and polarization of the Senate116 
are paired with nominations not getting confirmed, while early 
selections,117 presidential popularity,118 and cabinet positions119 are 
linked to nominations succeeding. 
The dataset constructed here could be used to test both 
nomination failure and confirmation length more holistically and 
systematically. For a flavor of such analysis, this Section focuses on 
nomination failure, specifically the likelihood of a nomination not 
being confirmed within the year it was made. I run a probit model, a 
regression model frequently used to estimate a binary response by a 
maximum-likelihood procedure, to analyze most of the nominations 
submitted to the Senate from January 20, 1981 through December 31, 
2014. The binary outcome—failure (by being returned to the 
 
committee stage); McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 43, at 1139; Ostrander, supra note 42, at 
25. 
 107. See McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 96, at 349–50; Ostrander, supra note 42, at 25. 
But see Binder & Maltzman, supra note 44, at 196–97 (finding no significant effect); Jo, supra 
note 96, at 32 (finding opposite result for appellate court nominations). 
 108. See Allison, supra note 106, at 10–11; Holmes et al., supra note 44, at 38. 
 109. See Edward Burmila, Anthony Madonna, Ian Ostrander & Mark E. Owens, 
Decommissioned Commissions: Holdover Capacity, Confirmation Dynamics and Independent 
Regulatory Commissions 17 (Apr. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). Holdover capacity (that is, commissioners’ ability to serve past their term for a 
period of time) may reflect either the importance of the agency or the importance of having the 
agency staffed. 
 110. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 252; Ostrander, supra note 25, at 144. 
 111. Ostrander, supra note 25, at 149. 
 112. See Krutz et al., supra note 57, at 876–77 (including “alleged wrongdoing, lack of 
qualifications, and ideological extremism”). 
 113. See id. at 878. 
 114. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 252. 
 115. See id.; Ostrander, supra note 25, at 144. But see Krutz et al., supra note 57, at 878 (not 
finding connection with divided government). 
 116. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 252; Nuñez, supra note 57, at 16. 
 117. See Ostrander, supra note 25, at 144. 
 118. See Krutz et al., supra note 57, at 878. 
 119. Id.  
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President, withdrawn by the President, or voted down by the Senate) 
or confirmation—is the dependent variable in the model. 
Drawing on previous work, the model includes several categories 
of explanatory variables. First, it considers major types of 
nominations: district court, appellate court, cabinet secretary, cabinet 
assistant secretary, executive agency, and IRC. Second, it examines 
the timing of the nomination: the year of the administration and 
whether the nomination was made in the last two months of a 
Congress. Third, it distinguishes among Presidents, including dummy 
variables for each presidential administration (dropping the Reagan 
administration, so all administrations are to be interpreted compared 
to it). Fourth, it considers the relationship between the White House 
and the Senate as well as dynamics within the Senate: whether the 
same party controlled the Senate and White House and whether the 
nomination was post–filibuster reform.  
Table 12 presents the results from this model. The coefficients 
are reported as marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered, 
generally at the individual agency or circuit level, but with some other 
categories, in case observations for a particular agency, circuit, or 
other type of entity are not independent. Cluster sizes are unequal; 
similar results are obtained without clustered standard errors and 
more independent variables. 
Table 12. Marginal Effects from Probit Model of Nomination Failure 
Dependent Variable is Final Outcome (1 for Failure (Return, 
Withdrawal, Rejection), 0 for Confirmation) 
 
Independent Variable Marginal Effect (standard error) 
 District Court                                   0.032 
                                 (0.040) 
Court of Appeals                                        0.203** 
                                  (0.053) 
Cabinet Secretary                                      -0.132** 
                                   (0.040) 
Cabinet Assistant Secretary                                   -0.015 
                                   (0.038) 
Executive Agency                                     0.012 
                                    (0.055) 
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White House Agency                                    0.003 
                                   (0.052) 
IRC or Board                                      0.097* 
                                   (0.058) 
Administration Year                                         0.027** 
                                    (0.003) 
Last Minute                                         0.578** 
                                    (0.031) 
Bush 41                                         0.061** 
                                    (0.021) 
Clinton                                         0.056** 
                                    (0.015) 
Bush 43                                         0.117** 
                                    (0.023) 
Obama                                         0.209** 
                                    (0.027) 
Divided Government                                         0.067** 
                                     (0.012) 
Post–Filibuster                                     -0.054 
                                      (0.030) 
65 clusters 
**p<0.01, *p<0.10 (2 tailed) 
Number of Observations 





                        12779 
                                 -6053.890 
                                1759.55 
Predicted Failures                                          19.49% 
(variables held at means) 
Actual Failures in Data 
                                        21.15% 
 
Many of the included factors are linked to a higher chance of 
failure. With respect to type of position, nominations to courts of 
appeals and IRCs were 20.3 and 9.7 percent, respectively, more likely 
to not be confirmed. With regard to timing within the administration, 
nominations in later years were 2.7 percent more likely to have failed, 
a statistically significant but substantively small effect. However, 
nominations in the final two months of a Congress were much more 
likely to fail, at nearly 60 percent more. Compared to nominations 
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under President Reagan, all later Presidents faced higher failure 
rates, with nominations under President Obama being 20.9 percent 
more likely not to be confirmed. Finally, nominations made when the 
White House and the Senate were controlled by different parties 
were 6.7 percent more likely to fail. 
A few factors are connected to a higher chance of confirmation. 
Nominations to the top position in cabinet departments (including 
service secretaries at the Defense Department) were 13.2 percent 
more likely to be confirmed. Although not statistically significant, 
nominations after the change to the Senate voting rules were less 
likely to fail. There seems to be no relationship between nominations 
to district courts, assistant secretary positions, executive agencies, or 
White House agencies and failure. 
These results largely support the descriptive findings in the 
previous Part, at least with respect to higher failure rates, and they 
allow comparisons across various dimensions. More research should 
be done, including considering potential interaction of these variables 
as well as including other factors. 
B. Possible Explanations for Post–Filibuster Reform Outcomes 
So far as I know, this Article is the first systematic study of 
nomination failure and confirmation delays for both judicial and 
agency nominations post–filibuster reform.120 Its main contribution is 
to show that although confirmation times for nominations to the 
courts decreased, they increased for all types of agencies, though for 
many agency positions significantly fewer nominations failed after the 
voting change. This Section explores several potential explanations 
for these outcomes. Future work would need to examine them more 
closely to determine their validity. 
First, Republican Senators (or Democratic Senators who did not 
want to follow the Democratic leadership) likely substituted other 
delaying mechanisms for the filibuster after the November 2013 
change. That change affected only the number of Senators needed to 
put a nomination up for a final vote. Senators, for example, can still 
refuse to submit blue slips on judicial nominations to federal courts in 
their states; both slips need to be returned under current Senate 
norms for a vote to take place.121 In addition, Senators on a committee 
 
 120. Cf. Boyd et al., supra note 39 (examining judicial nominations pre and postreform).  
 121. See Charlie Savage, Despite Filibuster Limits, A Door Remains Open To Block Judge 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, at A18.  
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to which a nomination has been referred can submit extensive (and 
time-consuming) written questions to the nominee that have to be 
answered before the committee votes on a nomination. For instance, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee submitted 328 “advance 
policy questions” to Ashton B. Carter, whom President Obama 
recently nominated to be Secretary of Defense.122 Republican 
Senators also required a vote on nearly all nominations after the 
change, refusing to acquiesce to time-saving unanimous consent 
procedures.123  
Comparing these alternative delaying mechanisms across time, 
however, is difficult. One could compare the D.C. Circuit, for which 
there are no Senators to file blue slips, with other courts of appeals. 
The number of nominations to the D.C. Circuit, however, is very 
small. But outside of this, it is hard to make headway, as there is no 
reliable and easily accessible source of information on the use of 
those other devices over a long period of time.124  
Second, Democratic Senators may have shifted how they 
scheduled nominees in light of the change in voting rules. Specifically, 
they may have postponed more routine nominees to get through 
more contentious nominees earlier, leading to those routine nominees 
having longer confirmation times than they would have had before 
the voting change. Relatedly, the type of nominees may have shifted. 
President Obama may have appointed individuals who catered to the 
Senate majority, rather than the filibuster-proof majority, and was 
willing to have nominations fail, leading to outcomes in 2014 that may 
not look that different than 2013. Noting that only 15 of 96 votes on 
judicial nominations had fewer than 60 affirmative votes, Russell 
Wheeler of the Brookings Institution concludes that “the great 
majority of the 2014 confirmations would have occurred even under 
the old rule.”125 For some judicial nominations, President Obama did 
 
 122. Helene Cooper, Defense Nominee Says He Would Consider More U.S. Military Aid to 
Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/us/politics/defense-
secretary-nominee-looks-to-send-senate-panel-strong-message.html. 
 123. See Coe, supra note 78; Kamen & Kane, supra note 39; Wilson, supra note 78. 
 124. Cf. Ryan J. Owens, Daniel E. Walters, Ryan C. Black & Anthony Madonna, Ideology, 
Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 347, 376 (2014) (using released data on blue slips from 107th to 110th Congress). 
 125. Russell Wheeler, Record Lame Duck Confirmations Pad Obama’s Improving Judicial 
Record, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 22, 2014, 9:00AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/
posts/2014/12/19-obama-lame-duck-judicial-confirmation-success-wheeler. To be sure, if you 
count the twelve votes at the very end of 2014, permitted only because of Republican Senators 
criticizing a spending bill, see supra note 32, as nominations that would not have succeeded 
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seem to compromise with Senate Republicans, at least in states with a 
Republican Senator (presumably because of the blue slip tradition). 
For instance, the rejection by Senate Democrats (through return to 
the President, with no renomination) of Michael P. Boggs for a 
district court position shows that President Obama went too far in 
trying to placate Georgia Republicans in that selection.126 To test 
these explanations, there would need to be some measure of the 
“extremity” of the nominees. The Article turns to the wider issue of 
nominees in Section C. 
Third, the number of nominations may have been a factor, at 
least in combination with other factors. In the year before the change, 
President Obama submitted 485 nominations; the year after he 
submitted 575 nominations. The largest increases were in district 
court and cabinet nominations. But those entities had different 
outcomes in the year after the change: confirmation delays decreased 
for the former and increased for the latter. Nevertheless, the 
combination of workload and type of nominee may have interacted in 
ways to explain that difference. 
Finally, the midterm election occurred in the year after the 
voting change, which must have shaped the confirmation process. 
One could compare nominations in the first few months of 2013 and 
2014.127 In addition, it would be important to examine the process the 
next time the same party controls the White House and the Senate.128 
For instance, with a longer time period under the new regime, it 
would be possible to filter out election years (which fall in the second 
year of a two-year Congress) from other years. From Tables 4 and 8, 
the second year of each Congress appears to have higher failure rates 
and, except for the first year of an administration, a shorter 
confirmation process, on average. 
 
under the old rule, close to one-third of judges confirmed in 2014 would not be on the bench if 
the Senate voting rules had not changed. 
 126. See Carl Hulse, Obama Judicial Choice is Urged to Withdraw, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2014, at A19.  
 127. I performed some preliminary analysis. Comparing nominations made in the first three 
months of 2013 and in the first three months of 2014, the confirmation process lengthened for 
successful nominations (from 137.3 days to 163.0 days). But the failure rate also increased (14.7 
percent to 22.6 percent). 
 128. It may also take more time than one year for the President and the Senate to figure out 
how they will deal with PAS positions under the new rule as a long-term matter.  
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C. The Nomination Question 
What much previous work using large numbers of nominations 
does not consider are particular characteristics of the nominees—
their educational background, experience, and connection to the 
President, for example.129 If the nomination and confirmation 
processes interact, as they presumably do, these characteristics would 
matter.130 As suggested in the previous Section, changes to either part 
of the staffing process could also cause changes to the other. For 
example, after the change to the Senate rules, how did Obama shift 
his judicial and agency picks? Many assume that the filibuster rules 
encouraged moderation in presidential picks.131 But testing that 
assumption is difficult, particularly in the agency context.132 
Because of the large number of nominations here (close to 
16,000 nominations in the dataset), it would be very hard to get much 
information on nominees at the time of nomination. The rare work 
that exists considers campaign contributions. Those measures include 
contributions post nomination, which make them somewhat cloudy 
measures of pre-nomination characteristics. Nevertheless, the 
measures should be considered in an analysis of the 2013 change. It 
appears that President Obama did not select more liberal judicial 
nominees after the voting rule change, but no work, to my knowledge, 
has examined agency nominees.133 
There is another possibility to consider: the official descriptions 
of the nominations from congress.gov almost always include the state 
of residence for the nominee. Of the 1412 nominees from California, 
 
 129. But see Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen & Tim Johnson, Automated Methods for 
Estimating the Political Ideology of Individual Public Bureaucrats Across Time and in a 
Common Ideological Space (2012) (unpublished mauscript) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (using text-matching algorithm to generate ideological measures of PAS officials from 
the Federal Election Commission’s contribution records); Adam Bonica, Mapping the 
Ideological Marketplace, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 369–70 (2014) (same); Boyd et al., supra note 
39. 
 130. See, e.g., Nokken & Sala, supra note 90; Bailey & Spitzer, supra note 90. 
 131. See Edward H. Stiglitz, Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the 
Judiciary, 39 LEG. STUD. Q. 27, 27–28, 30 (2014) (collecting citations for judicial nominations). 
 132. There is some work on judicial nominations, prior to the 2013 change. See Timothy R. 
Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court 
Nominations, 32 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 31 (2005); David M. Primo, Sarah A. Binder & Forrest 
Maltzman, Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
471 (2008); Stiglitz, supra note 131.  
 133. See Boyd et al., supra note 39, at 9, 12 (using common-space campaign finance 
measures to examine President Obama’s judicial nominations before and after the 2013 
change). 
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President Reagan nominated 401 of them (comprising 11.6 percent of 
his 3455 nominations with residence information). Of the 778 
nominees from Texas, President George H.W. Bush picked 109 
(making up 5.9 percent of his 1847 nominations) and President 
George W. Bush selected 291 (making up 7.2 percent of his 4022 
nominations). Of the 161 nominees from Arkansas, President Clinton 
nominated 72 of them (comprising 2.0 percent of his 3594 
nominations). And of the 511 nominees from Illinois, President 
Obama selected 117 (making up 4.0 percent of his 2913 nominations). 
Of 15,838 nominations with state information, 4652 list the District of 
Columbia, Maryland or Virginia for the nominee’s residence. 
Are nominees from the President’s home state—who are 
presumably more likely to be political connections of the President—
named earlier in the administration? Do nominees from the 
President’s home state fail more often or take longer to confirm? 
What about nominees from the D.C. area? Table 13 displays how 
home-state nominations fall by administration year. Figure 6 shows 
the percentage of D.C. area nominees over time, with a trend line 
over the period. 
Table 13. Percentage of Home-State Nominations by Year of 
Administration 
 
Time in Administration Home-State Nominations (as percentage of all 
Home-State nominations) 
First Year 18.6 
Second Year 16.7 
Third Year 16.9 
Fourth Year 11.0 
Fifth Year 13.5 
Sixth Year 8.0 
Seventh Year 8.3 
Eighth Year 7.4 
 
Of the home-state nominations, most occurred in the first year of 
an administration; they generally declined over the course of a term 
and rebounded in the first year of a second term. Home-state 
nominations did not fail at a higher rate overall (23 percent failure 
rate) and took about the same amount of time to confirm if successful 
O'CONNELL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:15 PM 
2015] CONFIRMATION RATES AND DELAYS 1691 
(85.3 days on average), but because fewer nominations failed and 
confirmation times were faster early in an administration, home-state 
nominations did seem to fare worse on both measures. 
Figure 6. Percentage of D.C. Area Nominations (of Total 
Nominations), 1981–2014 
The percentage of nominations from the D.C. area rose over the 
past three decades, and generally increased over the course of an 
administration except under President George H.W. Bush. What is 
perhaps most striking is that almost 30 percent of all nominations 
came from the D.C. area. 
These are just a few snapshots on the residence of nominees in 
the dataset; more study is needed. That study should likely focus on 
agency nominations, as judicial nominations have less geographic 
flexibility because choices are often constrained to match court 
location.  
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical work here does not lead directly to policy 
proposals. To start, this Article focuses on only one part of staffing 
important judicial and agency positions—the Senate’s role. Another 
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important component is the President’s role. My previous work has 
shown that the lag in nominations often exceeds the lag in 
confirmation, sometimes quite significantly.134 In addition, as noted 
above, the two interact: who the President selects affects the reaction 
of the Senate and the expected reaction of the Senate shapes who the 
President nominates. Finally, the dataset has no measure of the 
consequences of failed nominations or long confirmations. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that most of the time, 
delays in staffing agencies have deleterious effects.135 Most critically, 
without confirmed political appointees, agencies may shy away from 
needed action, including rulemaking and enforcement.136 More 
specifically, there are effects on both the demand and supply side of 
the nominations process. On the demand side, Presidents may turn to 
substitutes such as acting officials, White House czars,137 and recess 
appointments,138 which even if constitutional, may have less 
 
 134. See O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 10. 
 135. To be clear, I am not claiming that staffing delays always produce negative 
consequences. For instance, it may take more time to get a particularly qualified person to take 
an important job. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 946–47. Alternatively, turnover might produce 
innovative solutions to intractable policy problems. Id. at 947–48. Sometimes, it might promote 
social welfare to have agency inaction. Id. at 948–49. Finally, acting officials, particularly 
longserving senior career employees at the agency, may be more competent at certain tasks than 
political picks. Id. at 949–50. More recently, Nina Mendelson’s Article in this Symposium 
suggests that confirmed agency officials were not necessary for certain complex rulemakings to 
occur. See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the 
Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1587–97 (2015).  
 136. See O’Connell, supra note 7, at 938–39. But see Mendelson, supra note 135, at 1585 
(“Thus, even with a vacancy and no designated official, rules in the Federal Register, for 
example, can be properly signed.”). The lack of action may be voluntary, in the sense that acting 
officials have the authority to act but may choose not to exercise that authority because of 
White House or congressional pressure. In other cases, the agency will have no choice and will 
not be able to make decisions. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 560 
U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (“If Congress wishes to allow the Board to decide cases with only two 
members, it can easily do so. But until it does, Congress’ decision to require that the Board’s full 
power be delegated to no fewer than three members, and to provide for a Board quorum of 
three, must be given practical effect rather than swept aside in the face of admittedly difficult 
circumstances.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Warren Expected to be Advisor, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2010, at 
A18.  
 138. See, e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, A Miner Matter, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at D1; see also 
Ryan C. Black, Anthony Madonna, Ryan Owens & Michael Lynch, Adding Recess 
Appointments to the President’s “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers, 60 POL. RES. Q. 645, 646–48 
(2007) (examining the use of recess appointments by Presidents, but neglecting to realize that 
independent agencies cannot be staffed with acting officials); Nicole Schwartzberg, What is a 
“Recess”?: Recess Appointments and the Framers’ Understanding of Advice and Consent, 28 J. L. 
& POL. 231, 234 (2013) (viewing recess appointments as “a core unilateral executive power”).  
O'CONNELL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:15 PM 
2015] CONFIRMATION RATES AND DELAYS 1693 
accountability.139 Alternatively, when acting officials, czars, and recess 
appointees are not possible (either legally or politically), there may 
be fewer officials to make important decisions.140 Courts with fewer 
judges, for example, may spend less time on cases or rely on visiting 
judges to hear cases.141 
On the supply side, talented individuals may turn down White 
House entreaties for these important agency and judicial positions. 
 
 139. See E.J. DIONNE & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, BROOKINGS INST., A HALF-EMPTY 
GOVERNMENT CAN’T GOVERN: WHY EVERYONE WANTS TO FIX THE APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS, WHY IT NEVER HAPPENS, AND HOW WE CAN GET IT DONE, Dec. 14. 2009, at 3; 
O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 12; O’Connell, supra note 7, at 943–45; see also BARBARA L. 
SCHWEMLE, TODD GARVEY, VIVIAN CHU & HENRY HOUGE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40856, THE DEBATE OVER SELECTED PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS: 
APPOINTMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 54, 56 (2011) (noting 
that White House advisors generally face less congressional oversight than recess appointees at 
the back end). But cf. Patrick Hein, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The 
Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 235, 241 (2008) (arguing that broad 
recess appointment power “provides for a more effective functioning of government than a 
narrow recess appointment power would offer”); Aaron Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic 
Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2592 (2011) (arguing 
that czars may be an “ingenious compromise” to get neutral competence without interest-group 
capture). To be sure, on some level, Presidents may prefer recess appointees and White House 
advisors to confirmed officials, as the former picks are not “compromise” selections who must 
obtain Senate approval.  
 140. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Vacancies Pose Threat to Fed, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2014, at 
B1 (noting that in two recent meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets 
monetary policy, “a majority of the votes were cast by the regional presidents, who are allocated 
five votes [of the twelve] on the committee on a rotating basis”). 
 141. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 10, at 258; Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2011) (analyzing the impact of judicial burdens on outcomes); 
Carolina Bolado, 11th Circ. Nears Full Strength as Nomination Backlog Eases, LAW360 (Aug. 8, 
2014 7:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/565697/11th-circ-nears-full-strength-as-nomi
nation-backlog-eases (discussing difficulty of operating the court without a full staff); see 
generally Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2388–89 (2014) 
(summarizing “exponential” growth in caseloads at the appellate level and calling it a “crisis”). 
Part of the controversy before the Senate rules change concerned Obama’s three nominations 
to the D.C. Circuit. Republicans claimed there was no “pressing need.” See Tom Clark & 
Sanford Gordon, Was the Nuclear Option About Filling the Courts or Filling the Courts with 
Democrats?, WASH. POST MONKEY CAGE BLOG (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/23/was-the-nuclear-option-about-filling-the-courts-or-
filling-the-courts-with-democrats (finding that “efficiency was unlikely the driving force behind 
the obstruction that precipitated the nuclear option”); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. 
Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the plaintiff who sued over the filibuster 
rule failed to show a link between “delayed vacancy filling and delayed adjudication”). But see 
Russell Wheeler, Federal Judicial Nomination: Skunky D.C. Stats, Justified Ideological 
Nominations, Vacancies Without Nominees, BROOKINGS FIXGOV (Nov. 4, 2014, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/11/4-federal-judicial-nominations-dc-stats-
vacancies-wheeler (noting that “developing valid comparative workload measures is a 
challenge”). 
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Surveys of elites in the private sector indicate that potential nominees 
are leery of the confirmation process.142 This leads to little “new 
blood” in the government.143 As shown in the previous Section, nearly 
thirty percent of all nominees from 1981 to 2014 hailed from the D.C. 
area and the trend is positive over the past three decades. Such 
individuals are more likely to have government work experience. 
Instead of top officials being drawn from a wide range of career paths 
and states (and returning to those jobs), Presidents may be 
increasingly relying on a D.C. elite that cycles in and out of appointed 
positions and private and think tank jobs inside the Beltway. 
Individuals who agree to be nominated may also be affected. 
Some withdraw, such as Anthony Lake when nominated to head the 
CIA by President Clinton.144 Many who are not confirmed 
understandably harbor resentment. And some who are confirmed to 
agency posts may be less willing to engage cooperatively with 
Congress in their positions or to go through the process again.145 As 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy 
Thompson explained in a 2001 interview: “It’s not a partisan thing . . . 
it’s just a terrible ordeal, and good people, especially in the future, are 
just going to say—I’d never go through it again.”146 
If the goals then are to decrease both the number of failed 
nominations and the confirmation time for successful nominations, 
several changes may help.147 The focus here is on plausible reforms. In 
 
 142. See PAUL C. LIGHT & VIRGINIA L. THOMAS, BROOKINGS INST., POSTS OF HONOR: 
HOW AMERICA’S CORPORATE AND CIVIC LEADERS VIEW PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 10 
(2001). 
 143. See G. Calvin Mackenzie, Hung Out to Dry: Let’s Stop Our Shabby Treatment of Those 
We Ask to Serve, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at B5 (claiming that “our government is now 
largely run by a governing class”). Russell Wheeler has suggested that delays “help explain why 
the proportion of district judges who came from private practice of law has decreased from 
about two thirds during the Eisenhower administration to one third now, and the proportion of 
former state and term-limited federal judges has increased.” Wheeler, supra note 26. 
 144. See Mackenzie, supra note 143 (quoting Lake’s “scathing withdrawal letter” where 
Lake describes the process as “nasty and brutish without being short”).  
 145. See LIGHT & THOMAS, supra note 74, at 4, 10–11 (finding through a survey that 
“confusion and embarrassment are . . . increasing”).  
 146. Government in Molasses, WASH. POST, June 12, 2001, at A25. 
 147. Presumably, the main objective is to decrease the time a position is vacant—from the 
time of departure of the preceding official to the time a new “permanent” (that is, neither acting 
nor recess) official begins. This can be done in a variety of ways: by increasing how long officials 
stay, by decreasing how long Presidents take to choose replacements, or by decreasing the 
length of the Senate process. This Article focuses on the third approach. In other work, I have 
made three proposals on the first approach (requiring executive-agency officials to commit to 
serve for a full presidential term, or at least for two years; ensuring that agency officials receive 
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large part, the reforms draw from public administration, rather than 
politics. That is not to deny the political nature of the process but 
rather to emphasize “bureaucratic” changes that might have 
meaningful consequences. 
First, as national commissions, the Government Accountability 
Office and commentators (including Paul Light and William Galston) 
advocate, fewer agency positions should be subject to Senate 
confirmation.148 By taking the Senate out of the process, this reform 
targets both nomination failure and confirmation delay. In previous 
work I was skeptical of such a change, targeting it as politically 
infeasible.149 But the bipartisan Presidential Appointment Efficiency 
and Streamlining Act of 2011 cut confirmation mandates for 163 
positions, such as Assistant Secretary positions for Administration 
and Management as well as for Public Affairs.150 There are many 
 
comprehensive and institutionalized training to improve performance and relationships with 
Congress and the White House; and increasing the salary and benefits of agency officials) and 
four proposals on the second approach (making more agency leadership choices earlier, even 
before a President takes office, and devoting more resources to the appointments process; 
having Presidents pay more attention to lower-level agency positions; planning for future 
appointments before resignations are announced; and asking appointees to provide four weeks 
of notice before leaving). O’Connell, supra note 7, at 988–97. I have also made three proposals 
on the third approach (cracking down on holds by individual Senators; fast-tracking some 
nominations; and encouraging more Senate deference). O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 17–18. 
All of my previous reform suggestions have targeted agency, rather than judicial, vacancies.  
 148. See, e.g., DIONNE & GALSTON, supra note 139, at 17; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 164, 266 (2000); HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF 
STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS IN WASHINGTON 260 (1977); PAUL C. LIGHT, A 
GOVERNMENT ILL EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO 
REVERSE IT 91 (2008); H. COMM. ON POST OFFICE & CIVIL SERV., 101ST CONG., REP. AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC SERV. 17–19 (Comm. 
Print 1989); NAT’L COMM’N ON PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING 
THE FED. GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19–20 (2003); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-07-235R, SUGGESTED AREAS FOR OVERSIGHT FOR THE 110TH CONGRESS 40 
(2006); James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 63 (1987). 
 149. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 7, at 988. Political appointees generally favor the 
creation of more political positions. See Carolyn Ban & Patricia W. Ingraham, Short-Timers: 
Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan 
Administration, 22 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 106, 118–19 (1990). In addition, Congress often prefers to 
have a role in the appointments process. Evan Weinberger, Legislation To Increase NY Fed 
Oversight Reintroduced, LAW360 (Feb. 23, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
624304/legislation-to-increase-ny-fed-oversight-reintroduced.  
 150. Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
166, 126 Stat. 1283; see also Carl Hulse, Senate Votes to Streamline the Confirmation Process, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A18 (noting that it was a “rare step of relinquishing power” but 
that the law passed “easily,” on a 79–20 vote). All negative votes came from Republicans. Ian 
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more positions that qualify as inferior offices and thus under the 
Constitution do not require confirmation, if Congress chooses an 
acceptable alternative.151 
To be sure, there is some balance to be struck. The confirmation 
process adds accountability. The Senate clings to its role, noting in a 
study on the appointments process: “The confirmation hearing is the 
only point in the appointment process of Federal officials that offers 
the public an opportunity to evaluate the qualifications of a 
nominee.”152 It is not clear in our modern world whether the hearing 
itself is critical, but the availability of information to the public and 
the need for Senate agreement can foster accountability. But if the 
Senate is spending less time confirming members to part-time Boards 
of Trustees, the institution could spend more time on Assistant 
Secretaries of important policy areas. 
In addition, the confirmation process may add “stature” to 
positions, giving officials necessary authority within an agency. For 
instance, the Senate removed Chief Financial Officers from the 2011 
Act, citing concerns that CFOs needed the “full respect of other 
agency employees” to promote “successful financial operations within 
agencies.”153 It is not clear that these respect benefits outweigh the 
costs of having acting officials in the gaps, however. It may also be 
possible to provide these more informal forms of authority outside of 
the confirmation process. In sum, it might be more important to staff 
certain oversight positions quickly than to have Senate 
confirmation.154 
Second, in line with other reform proposals, Senate requirements 
for confirmation should be streamlined.155 This reform focuses more 
 
Ostrander, Conceding Confirmation? Recent Reforms in the Executive Nominations Process 7 
(Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 151. Arguably, any official directed and supervised by someone other than the President 
qualifies as an inferior officer. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) 
(holding that “[w]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior”). 
 152. U.S. SENATE, supra note 73, at 1349. 
 153. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41872, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, 
THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND CHANGES MADE IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 13 
n.45 (2012). 
 154. See Patrick S. Roberts & Matthew Dull, Guarding the Guardians: Oversight Appointees 
and the Search for Accountability in U.S. Federal Agencies, 25 J. POL’Y HIST. 207 (2010) 
(examining long delays in staffing Inspector General, Chief Financial Officer, and General 
Counsel positions and noting ironically that this may lead to less accountability). 
 155. See, e.g., The State of the Presidential Appointment Process: Hearing before S. Comm. 
on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001); DIONNE & GALSTON, supra note 139, at 14–15; 
Terry Sullivan, Fabulous Formless Darkness: Presidential Nominees and the Morass of Inquiry, 
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on shortening the length of the process than on reducing nomination 
failures. To start, the Senate should not be asking for information that 
the nominee has already provided in the process. The Senate, to be 
fair, is not the only culprit. Currently, a nominee fills out different 
forms for the White House, Office of Government Ethics, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and Senate.156 The first three entities are 
vetting the nominee for the White House, which understandably 
wants to avoid embarrassment.157 According to the Congressional 
Research Service, “[t]he background checks for nominees are 
essentially restarted once the nomination is sent to the Senate, since it 
appears that the President tends not to share the background 
information with the Senate.”158 In a 2001 hearing, agency official 
Sean O’Keefe testified that there was extensive overlap: “The Form 
86, the Committee questionnaire, and the President’s general counsel 
request for information probably covers 75 percent of the same 
material.”159 Overlapping information such as education should be 
entered in one place and shared with all.160 Improvements in 
information technology should make this easy to do; President 
Reagan’s nominees were filling out Form 86 on a typewriter but 
current nominees should not be. 
In addition, the Senate should agree, where practicable, on 
standard forms so that the same person does not have to submit 
different background forms and information depending on which 
committee has jurisdiction.161 For instance, commentators E.J. Dionne 
and William Galston have pointed to a married couple who filed 
taxes jointly, both of whom were nominated by President Obama to 
positions falling under different committees. The confirmation 
demands on their household finances, though joint finances, varied 
considerably.162 At the least, certain positions common to many 
agencies, such as Inspectors General or General Counsels, could have 
 
BROOKINGS INST. (Spring 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/03/spring-
governance-sullivan (last visited April 24, 2015). 
 156. See CAREY, supra note 153, at 8; Sullivan, supra note 155. 
 157. See CAREY, supra note 153, at 8. 
 158. Id. The Ethics in Government Act does require that certain financial information and 
potential conflicts of interest be disclosed to the relevant Senate committees. Id. 
 159. S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 155, at 7. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See DIONNE & GALSTON, supra note 139, at 15 (noting that standardizing Senate forms 
is more difficult to achieve than cutting back on duplication). 
 162. Id.  
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identical forms, with any necessary agency-specific questions added 
on.163 Finally, the Senate in creating these forms should try to decrease 
the number of unique questions to the nominee.164 Streamlining 
disclosures may not be unrealistic. It is costly, but primarily only in 
the short term in figuring out the implementation. It comes with few 
political costs in the long-term, and it would be greatly appreciated by 
nominees.165 
Third, as I and others have called for previously, the Senate 
should impose time limits on itself, for at least some categories of 
nominations.166 Like the previous proposal, this reform targets the 
length of the process. For example, there are nominations that 
eventually get confirmed with little recorded opposition, such as when 
Martha Johnson, who was nominated to head the General Services 
Administration on May 4, 2009, was confirmed almost a year later on 
February 4 on a 94–2 vote.167 More generally, nominations to cabinet 
departments and executive agencies generally receive more deference 
(in terms of whether they are confirmed, not how long they take, 
which varies by position level) as those agencies are closer to the 
President.168 Ideally, the Senate would impose a binding deadline on 
itself to vote, such as three months from when the nomination is 
received. The Senate operates under deadlines in other contexts—
fast-track repeal of major regulations under the Congressional 
Review Act, for instance. To the extent that delay is signaling 
opposition (to some statute, for example) there may be other ways 
besides delaying confirmation to advance that concern, such as 
amending the statute or engaging in other oversight mechanisms.169 
 
 163. Alternatively and less plausibly, there could be fewer committees that consider such 
positions. See generally DAVIS & MANSFIELD, supra note 66 (listing which positions fall under 
which committee). 
 164. See Sullivan, supra note 155. 
 165. See, e.g., LIGHT & THOMAS, supra note 74, at 21; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-28FS, POLITICAL APPOINTEES: SELECTED APPOINTEES’ VIEWS OF 
THEIR FEDERAL WORK ENVIRONMENT 5 (1992). 
 166. See O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 17–18. 
 167. Id. at 18. 
 168. Notably, the President has more ability to remove the leaders of these agencies than 
leaders of IRCs. See O’Connell, supra note 7, at 918–19 n.20. In addition, executive agencies and 
cabinet departments have to seek White House approval before issuing major regulations. See 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–
06 (2012). 
 169. O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 18 (explaining that refusing to confirm presidential 
nominations is not “a fair way to rein in government”). 
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At the least, the Senate could announce aspirational targets, 
which it could be criticized for missing. For example, after the 9/11 
Commission warned about delays in confirming national-security 
officials, the Senate agreed to a thirty-day target for such positions.170 
The courts present particular complexities, as the positions are 
lifetime appointments. Here, fast-tracking may not be as feasible or 
defensible.171 Instead, Senators of both parties could be more explicit 
about opposition based on partisan preferences.172 
Finally, more career (that is, long-term) government workers 
should be named to important agency jobs.173 The recent conflict over 
ambassadors may be due, in part, to President Obama naming fewer 
career Foreign Service officers to head U.S. embassies abroad.174 
Assuming transitions back to nonpolitical slots can be arranged, 
careerists may be both more willing and more qualified to serve in 
key agency positions.175 This change would both decrease the chance 
of nomination failure and the length of the confirmation process. 
These are concrete changes that would benefit both Republicans 
and Democrats. They do not depend on a return of old Senatorial 
courtesy or a change in norms.176 But they do depend on both parties 
 
 170. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 
§ 7601(b), 118 Stat 3638. More research is needed on whether these targets made a difference.  
 171. Cf. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1493–94 (1992) (calling for less deference to judicial 
nominations and arguing that less deference will—counterintuitively—make the process less 
partisan). But see Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, How to Fix the Senate?, WASH. POST, Feb. 
21, 2010, at A3 (calling for fast-tracking of judicial nominations). It is not clear where IRCs 
should fall. On one hand, like courts, they are not covered by the Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act of 1998, so openings cannot be filled by acting officials. In addition, unlike courts, IRCs 
generally sit at least partially in the Executive Branch. On the other hand, the appointments are 
for particular terms and, like courts, the positions have restrictions on removal.  
 172. See David Greenberg, Admit the Obvious—It’s a Political Process, WASH. POST, July 
18, 2004, at B3. 
 173. See O’Connell, supra note 7, at 994; see also Elliot L. Richardson & James P. Pfiffner, 
Politics and Performance: Strengthening the Executive Leadership System, in THE MANAGERIAL 
PRESIDENCY 175, 182–83, 192 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1999) (describing the difficulties in 
retaining qualified individuals in high-ranking agency positions). 
 174. See Juliet Eilperin, Obama Ambassador Nominees Prompt an Uproar with Bungled 
Answers, Lack of Ties, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
obama-ambassador-nominees-prompt-an-uproar-with-bungled-answers-lack-of-ties/2014/02/14/
20fb0fe4-94b2-11e3-83b9-1f024193bb84_story.html (noting that Presidents have generally 
nominated careerists for 70 percent of ambassadorships but that President Obama has picked 
careerists for between 47 and 63 percent of such jobs). 
 175. See O’CONNELL, supra note 40, at 15. 
 176. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments 
Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1689–90 (2001) (calling for shifts in appointments-related norms); 
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believing that the benefits, over time, of more efficient staffing of 
courts and agencies—no matter which party controls the White 
House—outweigh the costs (particularly when the President is from 
the opposite party), and then acting in line with those long-term 
interests. In sum, they are politically feasible reforms of a deeply 
political process. Nevertheless, although plausible, change is still 
difficult. Staffing delays are not a new problem, and these proposed 
reforms are not new solutions.177  
CONCLUSION 
Many important positions in the judiciary and administrative 
agencies sat empty for long periods of time, even after the exercise of 
the nuclear option by Senate Democrats in late 2013. Hopefully, we 
can draw some lessons from the failures of nominations and the 
confirmation process for nominations that did succeed in the 1981–
2014 period. The political stakes and consequences for governance 
are substantial. At the least, we have a more systematic 
understanding of failures and delays, particularly surrounding the 
change in Senate voting rules. 
  
 
George Packer, The Empty Chamber, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, at 38 (contrasting the rise of 
partisanship in the Senate with older practices). The CRS has flagged some interesting possible 
norms: “As a gesture of bipartisanship, should a newly elected President who is of the opposite 
political party as his predecessor renominate some of his predecessor’s judicial nominees who 
failed to receive Senate floor votes in the previous Congress?” “Where one or both of a state’s 
Senators are of the opposition party, would the Senators’ establishment of bipartisan selection 
commissions be a way, possibly acceptable to the President, for the Senators to influence which 
judicial candidates a President considers before selecting a nominee?” DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IS40340 ISSUE STATEMENT ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 5 (2010). 
 177. See Light, supra note 13, at A27; Paul C. Light, Back to the Future on Presidential 
Appointments, 64 DUKE L.J. 1499, 1499–1502 (2015). 
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DATA APPENDIX 
The dataset includes almost all civilian nominations submitted to 
the Senate from January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2014. It does not 
include (by choice) routine nominations needed for promotions 
within the Foreign Service, Public Health Service, and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, though it does include 
individual nominations to career ambassadorships and to be Surgeon 
General.178 Nominations in these excluded categories are often 
submitted in bulk, and the bulk nomination (for example, “40 
individuals”) becomes the official submitted record. Because military 
promotions are not civilian nominations, the dataset omitted them. 
For several dozen nominations (out of approximately 16,000) where 
there was no date for the last action or the final action was something 
other than confirmation or failure (through withdrawal, return, or 
vote rejecting), such as a referral to a committee, those nominations 
were not included. Many of these deleted nominations appeared 
again as full records on congress.gov (with a confirmation or failure as 
the final action date), and those full records were included. I made a 
handful of corrections involving duplicate nominations in the same 
year. Finally, I broke several dozen nomination records that covered 
multiple individuals (usually to an advisory board) into individual 
observations. There are 15,972 observations in the dataset. 
The “scraped” data from congress.gov provided the following 
fields: Name, Description of the Nomination (including the position 
and agency or court), Position, Date the Nomination was Received, 
the relevant Senate Committee (if any), the Final Action Taken on 
the Nomination, and the Date of that Last Action. The information, 
however, was not usable without significant cleaning and coding. 
Most notably, the Position field in the official data was filled with 
spelling errors, often did not identify the exact position (for example, 
“Secretary” rather than “Secretary of the Treasury”), and sometimes 
was empty. The Description of the Nomination, a long text field, was 
more complete and provided more information on the position, 
including the formal title.179 The problem I faced was that the position 
and the agency needed to be extracted from the Description field. 
Likewise, the Final Action field was a long text field, from which 
particular outcomes had to be extracted. 
 
 178. See supra note 52. 
 179. In several dozen observations, where the description field was empty, I used 
information from the position field. 
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This Appendix describes the cleaning and coding of the data I 
performed. It covers judicial and court-related nominations (positions 
and courts), agency nominations (positions and organizations), 
outcomes and durations, Senate committees, timing within the 
administration, political environment, and residence of nominee. 
A. Judicial and Court-Related Nominations 
For judicial and court-related nominations, I created the 
following judicial positions: District Court Judge; Court of Appeals 
Judge; Associate Justice; Chief Justice; and Judge on Non–Article III 
Court (U.S. Court of Federal Claims, U.S. Court of International 
Trade, U.S. Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims, U.S. Court of 
Military Appeals, U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals, and Superior 
Court of Washington, D.C.). I also created the following court-related 
positions: U.S. Marshal and U.S. Attorney. To be able to compare 
particular courts with particular agencies, I made binary variables for 
each of the federal courts of appeals: D.C. Circuit; Federal Circuit; 
First Circuit; Second Circuit; Third Circuit; Fourth Circuit; Fifth 
Circuit; Sixth Circuit; Seventh Circuit; Eighth Circuit; Ninth Circuit; 
Tenth Circuit; and Eleventh Circuit. Table A1 displays the 
frequencies of these positions and circuits. 
Table A1. Judicial and Court-Related Nominations 
 Judicial Variables Frequency 
 District Court Judge 1635 
Court of Appeals Judge 510 
Associate Justice 13 
Chief Justice 2 
Non–Article III Judge 266 
U.S. Marshal 541 
U.S. Attorney 648 
D.C. Circuit 47 
Federal Circuit 34 
First Circuit 17 
Second Circuit 35 
Third Circuit 39 
Fourth Circuit 53 
Fifth Circuit 48 
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Sixth Circuit 55 
Seventh Circuit 19 
Eighth Circuit 23 
Ninth Circuit 78 
Tenth Circuit 35 
Eleventh Circuit 27 
B. Agency Nominations 
For nonjudicial nominations, I created the following positions: 
Ambassador (which includes any position given the “rank of 
ambassador” in the position part of the description); General Counsel 
(including the Solicitor at the Labor and Interior Departments and 
the Legal Adviser at the State Department); Inspector General 
(which includes a handful of deputy Inspector Generals and special 
Inspector Generals); Chief Financial Officer; Assistant 
Administrator; Associate Administrator; Deputy Administrator; 
Administrator; Assistant Director; Associate Director; Deputy 
Director; Director (but not including members of a Board of 
Directors or Executive Directors); Assistant Secretary (or Assistant 
Attorney General); Under Secretary (or Associate Attorney 
General); Deputy Secretary (or Deputy Attorney General); Cabinet 
Secretary (or Attorney General and including service secretaries at 
the Department of Defense); Commissioner (or Chairman, 
Chairperson, or CEO) of nonadvisory Commission; Board Member 
(or Chairman, Chairperson, CEO, or Governor) of nonadvisory 
board; Executive Director; member of Board of Directors; member of 
Board of Regents; member of Board of Trustees; and member of 
advisory body (for example, National Council or Advisory 
Commission). Table A2 displays the frequencies of these positions. 
Table A2. Agency Positions 
Agency Position Variables Frequency 
Ambassador 2187 
General Counsel 243 
Inspector General 163 
Chief Financial Officer 85 
Assistant Administrator 198 
Associate Administrator 3 
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Deputy Administrator 81 
Administrator 248 
Assistant Director 30 
Associate Director 83 
Deputy Director 114 
Director  564 
Assistant Secretary (and Assistant Attorney 
General) 
1508 
Under Secretary (and Associate Attorney General) 400 
Deputy Secretary (and Deputy Attorney General) 190 
Secretary (and Attorney General) 176 
Commissioner or Head (non-advisory Commission) 1206 
Member or Head (non-advisory Board) 1206 
Executive Director 68 
Member (Board of Directors) 1262 
Member (Board of Regents) 38 
Member (Board of Trustees) 285 
Member (Advisory Body) 930 
 
Many descriptions of agency nominations (except for some 
cabinet nominations) made establishing agency variables 
straightforward. I created the following variables for IRCs and 
boards: CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission); CPSC 
(Consumer Product Safety Commission); CSHIB (Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board); EEOC (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission); FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission); FEC (Federal Election Commission); FED RESERVE 
(Federal Reserve); FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 
FHFB (Federal Housing Financing Board); FTC (Federal Trade 
Commission); ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission); ITC 
(International Trade Commission); NFSB (Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board); NLRB (National Labor Relations Board); NRC (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission); NTSB (National Transportation Safety 
Board); OSHRC (Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission); SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission); and STB 
(Surface Transportation Board). I combined all of these positions into 
an IRC agency variable. Table A3 displays the frequencies of 
nominations to these independent regulatory commission and boards. 
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Table A3. Nominations to Independent Regulatory Commissions and 
Boards 
IRC and Board Variables Frequency 
 CFTC 63 
CPSC 40 

















IRC AGENCY 958 
 
I created the following variables for White House agencies: CEA 
(Council of Economic Advisers); CEQ (Council on Environmental 
Quality); DRUG POLICY (Office of National Drug Control Policy); 
OMB (Office of Management and Budget); OSTP (Office of Science 
and Technology Policy); USTR (Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative). I also combined all of these positions into a WHITE 
HOUSE agency variable. I established the following variables for 
stand-alone executive agencies (that is, those not in cabinet 
departments): CIA (Central Intelligence Agency, often in description 
as Central Intelligence); EPA (Environmental Protection Agency); 
GSA (General Services Administration, often in description as 
General Services); NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration); OPM (Office of Personnel Management); SBA 
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(Small Business Administration); and USAID (Agency for 
International Development). And I put together all of these variables 
for an EXECUTIVE agency variable. Table A4 displays the 
frequencies of nominations to these White House and stand-alone 
executive agencies. 
Table A4. Nominations to White House and Stand-Alone Executive 
Agencies 
White House and 
Executive Agency Variables Frequency 
 CEA 43 
CEQ 10 













EXECUTIVE AGENCY 400 
 
For cabinet nominations, many did not include the full (or even 
partial) name of the cabinet department. I therefore used text 
matching to establish the agency binary variables (the terms used are 
in parentheses): USDA (Department of Agriculture; Agriculture; 
Farmers Home Administration; Federal Grain Inspection Service; 
Rural Electrification Administration; excluded United Nations and 
representative positions); DOC (Department of Commerce; National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Commerce; Patents and 
Trademarks; Foreign Commercial Services; Commissioner of 
Customs (when the position was at Commerce); Director of Census; 
excluded United Nations and ICC positions); DOD (Department of 
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Defense; Air Force; Army; Navy; Defense; excluded BRAC, NFSB, 
NNSA, DOE and negotiator positions); EDUC (Department of 
Education; Education; Rehabilitation Services Administration; 
excluded advisory entity, national boards related to Education, Board 
of Trustees, United Nations, education funds, USDA, and DOS 
positions); DOE (Department of Energy; Energy; National Nuclear 
Safety Administration; Alcohol Fuels; Economic Regulatory 
Administration; Office of Minority Economic Impact; excluded 
FERC, international energy, and bank positions); HHS (Health and 
Human Services; Social Security (but not SSA advisory board); 
Health; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid; excluded non-HHS 
health review, member, representative, Board of Regents, DHS, 
DOE, DOL, and VA positions); DHS (Homeland Security); HUD 
(Housing and Urban Development; excluded FHFB, FHFA, board of 
director, and national corporation positions); DOI (Interior; Bureau 
of Land Management; Fish and Wildlife Service; National Park 
Service; Office of Surface Mining Reclamation); DOJ (Justice; 
Attorney General; Solicitor General; U.S. Attorney; U.S. Marshal; 
Drug Enforcement; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of 
Alcohol; Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization at DOJ; 
Victims of Crime; excluded court and State Justice Institute 
positions); DOL (Labor; excluded FLRA, NLRB, and State 
positions); DOS (of State; Ambassador; Representative of the United 
States; Permanent Representative; Coordinator for Counter 
Terrorism; Director General of the Foreign Service; excluded DHS 
and USTR positions); DOT (Transportation; Federal Aviation 
Administration; Federal Highway Administration; Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration; Federal Railroad Administration; 
Federal Transit Administrator; Maritime Administration; Urban 
Mass Transportation; excluded Alaska Natural Gas, NTSB, STB, and 
DHS positions); TREAS (Treasury; Internal Revenue; Comptroller 
of the Currency; Mint); and VA (Veterans Affairs; excluded court 
and DOL positions). 
The Departments of Justice and State had large numbers of 
nominations, so I created second variables for each: DOJ2 (DOJ, with 
U.S. Attorney and U.S. Marshal positions removed); DOS2 (DOS, 
with Ambassador and Representative positions removed). I 
combined these variables (DOJ2 and DOS2) with the other thirteen 
cabinet variables into a CABINET agency variable. Table A5 
displays the frequencies of nominations to these cabinet departments. 
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Table A5. Nominations to Cabinet Departments 
Cabinet Department Variables Frequency 

















CABINET DEPARTMENT 3320 
 
C. Outcomes and Durations 
The field for final action taken on the nomination included 
approximately one thousand unique entries. Outcomes were broken 
into two large categories: Confirmed and Failed nominations. Each of 
those categories had subcategories as well. For confirmed 
nominations, there were Confirmations by Unanimous Consent, 
Confirmations by Voice Vote, Confirmations by Recorded Vote, and 
Other Confirmations (the last category was used then the last action 
was listed as simply “confirmed”). For recorded votes, the number of 
“yea” and number of “nay” votes were extracted and placed in 
separate columns: Yes Votes and No Votes. For failed nominations, 
there were Nominations Returned to the President, Nominations 
Withdrawn by the President, and Nominations that Were Voted 
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Down by the Senate.180 There were several dozen observations for 
which the final action was neither confirmation nor failure, for 
example, being referred to committee. As described above, I deleted 
those observations. Table A6 presents the frequency of the options 
for the failed and confirmed outcomes. 
Table A6. Outcomes of Nominations 
Outcome Variables Frequency 
 Unanimous Consent 3069 
Voice Vote 8442 
Recorded Vote 794 








All nominations had a date for the Senate’s receipt of the 
nomination and a date for the final action. I created three variables to 
describe these durations: Duration (no matter the outcome); 
Confirmed Duration (if the nomination was confirmed), and Failed 
Duration (if the nomination failed). Fourteen nominations had 
negative durations recorded in the congress.gov data (mostly, the 
nominations were confirmed at the start of a session and the official 
nomination was recorded as being received a few days later); I 
recoded those to zero. Table A7 presents the averages of these 
variables. 
 
 180. The Senate rejects very few nominations by full Senate vote. See SENATE ACTION, 
supra note 45, at 3 (agency nominations); MCMILLION, supra note 57, at 7 (judicial 
nominations). The three rejected nominations in the dataset are Robert Bork (nominated by 
President Reagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), John Tower (nominated by 
President George H.W. Bush to be Secretary of Defense), and Ronnie White (nominated by 
President Clinton to be a district court judge). Most failed nominations come from “committee 
inaction,” which causes nominations to be returned to the President. SENATE ACTION, supra 
note 45, at 3. 
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Table A7. Duration of Process (Nomination Date to Last Action) 
 
D. Senate Committees 
Most nominations had an assigned Senate Committee. I 
combined committees listed in congress.gov where it was clear the 
committees were essentially the same entity, despite a name change 
or minor change in jurisdiction: specifically, Governmental Affairs (to 
early 2004) and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (since 
2004) in Governmental Affairs; Labor and Human Resources (to 
early 1999) and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (since 1999) 
in Labor; and Small Business (to 1997) and Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship (since 1998) in Small Business. Before 2011, only 
forty-eight nominations had no committee assigned. These 
nominations were almost always to the highest cabinet positions, such 
as Secretary of State, in the first year of an administration.181 In 2011, 
the Senate agreed that certain nominations would be considered 
“privileged” and placed on the Executive Calendar, without being 
referred to a committee. Under this agreement, any Senator can 
request that any privileged nomination be referred to the appropriate 
committee.182 
The Budget and Small Business Committees handle the fewest 
nominations. The Budget Committee recently received joint 
jurisdiction over nominations for the Director and Deputy Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget, starting with the 109th 
Congress.183 The Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee 
examines only four positions at the Small Business Administration, 
 
 181. I did not recode these nominations to the committees that would normally handle 
them. It was not clear if the committee did not participate because of the timing or if the official 
nomination record on congress.gov is inaccurate. Given the small number, the results should not 
be affected. 
 182. S. RES. 116, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
 183. See DAVIS & MANSFIELD, supra note 66, at 13 n.46. Under new Senate practices, “if 
one committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must report within 30 
calendar days session, or be automatically discharged.” Id. 
Duration Variables Average (days) 
 All Outcomes  109.39 
Confirmed 88.51 
Failed 179.70 
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and one of those positions, Inspector General, is also handled by the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.184 
Table A8 presents the frequency of committees. 
Table A8. Committees Assigned to Nominations 
 Committee Variables Committee Name Frequency 
 Agriculture Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry 
319 
Armed Services Armed Services 720 
Banking Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs 
770 
Budget Budget 8 
Commerce Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation 
960 
Energy Energy and Natural Resources 413 
Environment Environment and Public Works 428 
Finance Finance 635 
Foreign Relations Foreign Relations 3849 
Governmental Affairs Government Affairs; Homeland 
Security and Governmental 
Affairs 
700 
Indian Affairs Indian Affairs 93 
Intelligence Intelligence 64 
Judiciary Judiciary 4035 
Labor Labor and Human Resources; 
Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions 
2467 
None No committee listed 259 
Rules Rules and Administration 85 
Small Business Small Business; Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship 
34 
Veterans’ Affairs Veterans’ Affairs 133 
Total  15,972 
 
 
 184. Id. at 42. 
O'CONNELL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:15 PM 
1712 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1645 
E. Timing within Administration 
Nominations and confirmations may differ over the course of a 
particular administration and of a particular Congress. For 
differences within an administration, I created binary variables for 
each year based on the date the nomination was received: First Year, 
Second Year, Third Year, Fourth Year, Fifth Year, Sixth Year, 
Seventh Year, and Eighth Year. President George H.W. Bush served 
only one term, so his nominations fell under only the first four 
variables. The dataset ends in December 2014, so President Obama’s 
nominations fell under only the first six variables. Nominations made 
by the outgoing President in January were not included in any 
variable. For differences within a Congress, I created the binary 
variable End of Congress to flag nominations made in the final two 
months (in other words, in November or December of an even-
numbered year). 
Table A9 presents the frequency of these timing variables. 
Table A9. Timing within Particular Administration and Congress 
Timing Variables Frequency 
 First Year  3200 
Second Year 2381 
Third Year 2460 
Fourth Year 1517 
Fifth Year 2063 
Sixth Year 1751 
Seventh Year 1451 
Eighth Year 1050 
  
End of Congress  392 
 
F. Political Environment 
The dataset includes nominations from January 1981 through 
December 2014, covering five presidential administrations. First, I 
created two variables for the nomination year. For the first, 
Nomination Year, I included any nomination received in the calendar 
year. For the second, Nomination Year 2, I removed nominations 
received in January by an outgoing President (for example, President 
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Carter’s nominations in January 1981). I created a binary variable to 
mark those 165 nominations: Outgoing President. (President Carter 
made nine; President Reagan made seventy-two; President George 
H.W. Bush made twenty-one; President Clinton made sixty-two; and 
President George W. Bush made one). The analysis in the Article 
used Nomination Year 2 when analyzing nominations by year. 
To distinguish the presidential administrations, I created the 
following variables, measured as of the date the nomination was 
received: Reagan; Bush 41; Clinton; Bush 43; and Obama. I was 
careful to assign nominations submitted between January 3 and 
January 19 of an outgoing administration to the outgoing President. 
(This meant that some nominations were not assigned to a President, 
as they were President Carter’s nominations in his final weeks in 
office in 1981.) The Senate majority sometimes was of the same party 
of the President and sometimes was not. Again using the date the 
nomination was received and being careful with nominations in the 
final weeks of an administration, I created a Divided Government 
variable that was marked 1 when the Senate majority and the 
President were from different parties (1987–1992, early weeks of 1993 
before Clinton took office, 1995–June 4, 2001 (before Senator 
Jeffords became an Independent and caucused with the Democrats), 
June 5, 2001 (after Jeffords switched)–2002, 2007–2008, and early 
months of 2009 before Obama took office. 
The Senate changed its rules on November 21, 2013, to no longer 
require sixty votes to close debate on any non–Supreme Court 
nomination. To compare nominations immediately before and after 
that change, I constructed three variables: Pre–Filibuster Reform, 1 
Year (November 20, 2012, to November 21, 2013), Pre–Filibuster 
Reform, Obama (January 20, 2009, to November 21, 2013), and Post–
Filibuster Reform (November 22, 2013–December 31, 2014). 
Table A10 presents the frequency of all these political variables. 
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Table A10. Political Environment 
Political Variables Frequency 
Reagan Administration 3508 
Bush 41 Administration 1861 
Clinton Administration 3617 
Bush 43 Administration 4055 
Obama Administration 2922 
  
Divided Government 7046 
Pre–Filibuster Reform (1 year) 485 
Pre–Filibuster Reform (Obama) 2347 
Post–Filibuster Reform  575 
 
G. Residence of Nominees 
The description of each nominee typically gives the state in 
which the nominee resides. For military officers, the description 
identifies the military branch instead of the state. And for nominees 
who are currently in an appointed position, the description identifies 
the current position when the nomination is for a position to run 
concurrently (as opposed to moving from one position to another). In 
sum, there were 134 observations with no state provided in the 
description (either because it was a military officer or a concurrent 
nomination from an agency position). For the rest, I created binary 
variables for the home states of the Presidents—California (for 
President Reagan), Texas (for Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
George W. Bush), Arkansas (for President Clinton), and Illinois (for 
President Obama)—and for the D.C. area: D.C., Virginia, and 
Maryland. If no state was provided in the description, the state 
variables have a missing value. I also created a binary Home-State to 
convey if the nominee came from the home-state of the nominating 
President. 
Table A11 presents the frequency of these residence variables. 
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Table A11. Residence of Nominees  
Residence Variables Frequency 






D.C. Area 4652 
 
 
 
